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STANDING'S EXPECTED VALUE
Jonathan Remy Nash*
This Article argues in favor of standing based on expected value of harm.
Standing doctrine has been constructed in a way that is oblivious to the
idea of expected value. If people have suffered a loss with a positive ex-
pected value, they have suffered an "injury in fact." The incorporation of
expected value into standing doctrine casts doubt on many of the Supreme
Court's decisions in which it denies standing because the relevant injury is
too "speculative" or is not "likely" to be redressed by a decree in the
plaintiff's favor This Article addresses this shortcoming in standing juris-
prudence by proposing a theory of expected value-based standing. It
argues that the Constitution presents no obstacle to expected value-based
standing, that the "injury-in-fact" test requires only a positive expected
value, and that the prudential barrier to generalized grievances is the sole
obstacle to expected value-based standing.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that Jones has an investment worth $10. Suppose that the gov-
ernment takes action that renders the investment worthless. Has Jones
suffered an "injury in fact"? The answer is clear. Jones has lost an asset, and
if the government takes that asset, it has injured Jones.'
Now suppose that Jones has another investment. It is far more likely
than not that the investment will turn out to be worthless. But there is a
small chance-1 in 10,000-that the investment will be worth $1 million.
Suppose that the government takes action that renders the investment cer-
tainly worthless. Has Jones suffered an "injury in fact"? Under existing
standing doctrine, the answer is fairly clear. Jones has lost an asset, the ex-
pected value of which is $100, and if the government takes that investment,
it has injured Jones.2
Now suppose that Smith faces a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000. Smith
wants the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to eliminate that risk,
which he believes it is legally required to do. The EPA refuses to act. Has
Smith suffered an "injury in fact"? Under existing doctrine, the answer is
not entirely clear; confusion over whether to classify the injury as procedur-
al or substantive muddles the issue.3 But using monetary figures for the
value of life the government itself has used, the expected value of a mortali-
ty risk of 1 in 100,000 is $60.'
Whether a plaintiff can establish that he or she has suffered an "injury in
fact" is critical to whether the plaintiff can pursue his or her legal action in
federal court. Traditional Article III standing jurisprudence requires that a
plaintiff demonstrate (1) "injury in fact," (2) a causal link between that inju-
I. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (endorsing the view that "an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing" (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968))); cf Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982) (allowing potential government liability for a de minimis physical taking under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
2. See, e.g., Toll Bros. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding
standing of real estate developer that held option to purchase a plot of real estate to challenge
regulations that precluded development of the plot). But cf DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of
Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that federal due process rights do not
arise until a property interest vests such that "a property right will not be recognized as cog-
nizable under the due process doctrine if the person claiming the right has a mere abstract
need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of the claimed right").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 54-71 (discussing how the Supreme Court has
not resolved the question).
4. Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Mon-
ey, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 183 (2007).
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ry and the conduct complained of, and (3) redressability s "Injury in fact" is
a necessary antecedent to standing analysis-without injury, there is no
causal link between the plaintiff and the challenged conduct, and there is
nothing to redress.
My principal claim is simple: standing doctrine has been constructed in
a way that is oblivious to the idea of expected value. If people have suffered
a loss with a positive expected value, they have suffered an "injury in fact."
It is unhelpful to say, as courts often have done, that an injury is "specula-
tive" or "conjectural"6 when it has a positive expected value. A 1-in-10,000
chance of losing $100,000 is the equivalent of a $10 loss (assuming risk
neutrality7), and a $10 loss is an injury. A small risk of death is an injury in
the sense that rational people would pay to eliminate the risk.8 Indeed, the
federal government treats small risks of death as injuries calling for a regu-
latory response.9
These points cast doubt on many of the Supreme Court's decisions in
which it denies standing on the ground that the relevant injury is too "specu-
lative" or is not "likely" to be redressed by a decree in the plaintiff's favor.'0
Speculative risks have a positive value; to suffer them is to suffer an "injury
in fact." If victory by the plaintiff would give the plaintiff an asset with a
positive expected value, then the plaintiff's injury would be redressed by a
decree in his favor.
Indeed, notwithstanding the Court's traditional oblivious attitude toward
it, the notion of expected value-based standing is consistent with the
essence of existing standing doctrine. Extant doctrine implicitly embraces
expected value by allowing standing in settings where the harm is far from
certain, and indeed merely probabilistic. For example, standing in declarato-
ry judgment actions necessarily assumes that relevant conduct will probably
come to pass. And standing in overbreadth challenges-in which a speaker
challenges a government speech restriction as possibly chilling the protected
speech of parties not before the court-presumes both that the government
5. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). For an
overview of current standing jurisprudence, see infra Section II.A.
6. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (rejecting plaintiff's
standing to challenge prosecutor's failure to file support proceedings against father of plain-
tiff's illegitimate child on the ground that "[tihe prospect that prosecution will, at least in the
future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative").
7. A person who is risk neutral is indifferent between a certain loss of a set amount
and any risk of suffering a larger loss that has an expected value equal to the set amount of the
comparable certain loss. In contrast, a risk-avoider might prefer a certain loss to a setting of
risk where he or she runs the risk of losing more (but also possibly losing less), even though
the expected values of the two scenarios are the same. See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated
Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. RaV. 721, 777 (2012).
8. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS 5 (1992).
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEo. L.J. 2255, 2255 (2002).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 34-46 (discussing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984), Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Linda R.S.,
410 U.S. 614).
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would prosecute actions that come near the margins of a statute and that
others, as a result, likely would not engage in such actions in the first place.
What, then, might explain the pattern in the rest of existing standing law,
which has had such difficulty in understanding a simple point about ex-
pected value? I suggest four possibilities. The first possibility is that courts
are simply confused. They do not understand that a small risk of a signifi-
cant harm is equivalent in value to a certain loss of a harm of a specified
magnitude. The second possibility is that in refusing to hear cases in which
plaintiffs complain about a loss of positive expected value, courts are relying
on common law conceptions of injury-conceptions that poorly fit modem
regulatory law. The third possibility, related to the second, is that some of
the key cases are not about "injury in fact" at all. They are grounded instead
in the (unarticulated) judgment that no relevant source of law should be tak-
en to grant the plaintiff a cause of action. The fourth possibility is that some
of the relevant decisions are based on judicial concerns over the generalized
nature of the harm. In some cases, millions of people face a loss with a posi-
tive expected value. In such cases, there should be no problem with
establishing an "injury in fact"; millions of people have been injured (in
fact). If a problem exists, it is that widely generalized harms should not be
judicially cognizable (at least when Congress has not explicitly said that
they should be)-the problem is not that Article III bars suits with a less-
than-certain likelihood of injury occurring.1
There is no reason to say that Congress lacks the power to channel into
federal court cases in which future harm is probabilistic. Nor does the inju-
ry-in-fact test bar courts from hearing such cases. If the plaintiff has lost a
small chance to gain a large amount, the loss is equal to an amount that
would unquestionably be a basis for standing. To be sure, the prudential bar-
rier on generalized harms might apply in some cases. But, so long as the
expected-value test is met, there is no reason to hold, as some courts have,
that Article III poses an obstacle to standing for probabilistic harms.
My argument overcomes objections that the Supreme Court has suggest-
ed in settings of possible probabilistic standing-statements hinting at
substantially certain injury (or even almost absolutely certain injury) as a
prerequisite for standing.'" It also provides a theoretical basis for the consti-
tutionality of probabilistic standing. Finally, it provides a guide to clarify the
existing, muddled lower court jurisprudence that generally recognizes prob-
abilistic standing, though in different ways and without consistent
theoretical underpinnings. 3
An added benefit of my proposal is that it provides a solution to a co-
nundrum that has flummoxed courts and commentators in cases of
procedural harm: should the injury for standing purposes be considered the
failure of the government to adhere to the proper procedure or rather some
11. See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 178-182 (discussing Supreme Court cases and
then discussing how the proposal would affect the reasoning in those cases).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 183-184.
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substantive result that arguably flows from that failure? 4 The latter concep-
tion of injury bears a closer resemblance to a typical "injury in fact"-and
perhaps even more importantly is the likely motivation for the lawsuit-but
it is also usually not the case that some particular substantive result will
necessarily result from a change in procedure. For example, the govern-
ment's preparation of an environmental impact statement ("EIS") in
deciding whether to undertake an action, as required by the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA")'5 does not mean that the government will
reach a different decision than it would have had it not prepared an EIS.'
6
Insofar as my proposal explicitly applies to harms that may or may not come
to pass, it is compatible with an understanding of the injury as the possible
change in substantive outcome.
Other commentators have advanced arguments on the topic of probabil-
istic standing. Professor Elliott relies on the notion of probabilistic harm to
argue that large organizations challenging government action logically
can-and should-have standing even when their individual members might
not. 17 Professor Hessick argues that, while the Supreme Court has consist-
ently rejected probabilistic standing, Article III in fact poses no barrier to
such standing; he suggests that courts ought to be free on prudential grounds
to reject cases with probabilistic standing on a case-by-case basis. 8 Profes-
sor Mank argues for risk-based standing in administrative law cases; he
suggests empowering courts with the discretion to reject cases involving de
minimis harm.' 9
14. See William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 247, 254-60, 255 n.33 (2001) (comparing and contrasting the two inconsistent
approaches and discussing Court opinions endorsing one view or the other); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229-34 (1988); Bradford C. Mank,
Informational Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 27-44 (2012) (noting
ongoing confusion over standing in cases involving procedural harm); Bruce Myers et al., The
Scope of Congressional Authority to Protect the Environment, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,977,
10,982-83 (2010) (statement by Professor Buzbee on how far Congress can go in extending
standing); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141 (1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judi-
cially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1188-95 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law]; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article I11, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) [hereinafter
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?].
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
16. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) (per curiam); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978); infra note 231 (discussing Justice Breyer's take on the implications of
this distinction for whether harm in an NEPA case will be irreparable for purposes of deciding
whether to grant a permanent injunction).
17. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 511 (2008).
18. See E Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 55, 101-02
(2012).
19. See Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to
Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 737-41 (2009).
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My approach differs substantially from these positions in a crucial re-
spect. Professors Elliott, Hessick, and Mank all address settings where the
probability of harm is comparatively low, making the issue of probabilistic
standing prominent. Not surprisingly, all three commentators' central focus
is cases in which a government action is challenged and, in particular, ad-
ministrative law cases.20 The approach I take is a much broader one. On the
one hand, I recognize that a special rule may be necessary in cases where it
is difficult to determine whether the expected value of harm will exceed a
minimal amount-that is, in cases not just where the probability of harm is
low but where the magnitude of harm is large (even catastrophic) and where
the harm is irreversible. 21 At the same time, I see no reason why cases with a
low likelihood of harm should themselves constitute a special category. All
expected value-based standing requires courts to do is to determine whether
the expected value of harm would be a sufficient basis for standing, were it a
"standalone" certain harm. Because it does not call on courts to determine
the expected value of harm with precision, the mere fact that the likelihood
of harm is low-or even subject to some debate22-- does not present a spe-
cial problem. Also, while there is no doubt that my proposal has special
purchase in the setting of administrative law,23 it is not limited to administra-
tive law cases.
24
Further, my approach grounds expected value-based standing in more
general standing doctrine, whereas other commentators' suggestions seem
more ad hoc and haphazard. For example, the approaches advanced by Pro-
fessors Hessick and Mank and the approach I advocate would often yield
similar outcomes-we all, it seems, would recognize constitutional authori-
ty for courts to hear administrative law cases where the harm alleged is
probabilistic, and we all would recognize courts' prudential power not to
hear such cases. But I, unlike the other commentators, see no reason why
this result should inhere only in administrative law cases. Professor Mank
expressly crafts his proposal in the setting of administrative law. Professor
Hessick defends probabilistic standing's constitutional bona fides, helpfully
separating the federal courts' equitable power to decline jurisdiction from
20. Professor Elliott's discussion of organizational standing finds its most natural home
in the administrative law setting. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 483-86. Professor Mank explic-
itly locates his proposal in the administrative law arena. Mank, supra note 19, at 737.
Professor Hessick explains that the "requirement of a sufficiently likely threat of injury fre-
quently arises in challenges to administrative actions." Hessick, supra note 18, at 63.
21. I have elsewhere advocated for precautionary-based standing in cases where the
probability of harm is low but the harm in question would, if it transpired, be catastrophic and
irreversible. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM.
L. REv. 494, 502-04 (2008).
22. See infra note 134 (discussing the applicability to the proposal of preferences over
lotteries of outcomes).
23. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 185-192 and accompa-
nying text (explaining how the proposal would remove current confusion over standing in
administrative law cases).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 178-182 (discussing cases outside the adminis-
trative law paradigm where expected value-based standing would apply).
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the constitutional minimum for courts to have jurisdiction in the first place."
Still, both commentators understand cases of probabilistic harm as calling
for special justification for federal court standing. In contrast, my approach
applies equally to all cases where the likelihood of harm is less than certain,
whether they are administrative or not, and whether that likelihood is espe-
cially small or otherwise. In addition, the discretionary power that
Professors Hessick and Mank suggest courts enjoy seems to arise specifical-
ly in cases of probabilistic standing.26 In contrast, the discretionary power
that I understand courts to enjoy is no different from the power that they
enjoy in all cases; specifically, I argue that the well-recognized freedom of
courts to decline jurisdiction where a harm is generalized would apply in
many cases of probabilistic harm.
Professor Elliott's suggestion for organizational standing in cases of
probabilistic harm is similarly tied to that particular setting: she proposes
that an organization have standing, even if none of its individual members
would alone have standing, if the aggregate probable harm to all members is
sufficient.27 My proposal, in contrast, avoids the asymmetrical treatment of
organizations and its members. It is also not limited to settings where indi-
vidual members' harms are exceedingly small.
Beyond the question of when the various proposals may apply, my pro-
posal also differs from those of the other commentators with respect to the
consistency of the proposal with existing doctrine. While Professor Hessick
does refute the notion that Article III poses a barrier to probabilistic stand-
ing, he also argues that the case law casts strong doubt on-if not outright
rejects-probabilistic standing. 28 In contrast, because my approach reaches
beyond explicit settings of probabilistic harm, I am able to explain how
much of the Court's jurisprudence implicitly embraces the notion of ex-
pected value-based standing. My proposal for expected value-based
standing emphasizes that the expected value of a harm looks very much
like-and creates much the same incentives for litigants who suffer-harms
that traditionally give rise to standing. To be sure, the proposal calls on
courts to understand "injury in fact" to include not only injuries that will
occur with certainty but also injuries that may occur with some positive
probability. However, many standing doctrines already recognize (if only
implicitly) this possibility.
29
Along similar lines, my proposal treats organizational standing consistent-
ly with existing doctrine, while Professor Elliott's proposal for organizational
standing does not. While extant doctrine recognizes organizational standing
25. See Hessick, supra note 18, at 77-80.
26. See id. at 91 (calling for federal courts to "develop prudential rules limiting stand-
ing in cases alleging small risks of injury"); Mank, supra note 19, at 737-41 (devising novel
federal court power to dismiss cases where probabilistic risk of serious injury does not exceed
one in one million).
27. Elliott, supra note 17, at 511.
28. See Hessick, supra note 18, at 61-65.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 210-231.
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when any member of the organization would have standing, Professor Elliott
would accept organizational standing even where no individual member
would have standing. In contrast, my proposal would find standing for an
organizational member-and therefore also for an organization-where the
expected value of the member's harm would, as a standalone harm, consti-
tute an "injury in fact."
In Part I of this Article, I consider the question of probabilistic standing
in existing jurisprudence. I survey three of the foundational Supreme Court
"building blocks" of modem standing law and explain how the Court seems
to have relied on the speculative nature of the injury to dismiss the cases,
even though such reliance was unnecessary. I also discuss some recent Su-
preme Court cases that are more ambivalent about the propriety of
probabilistic standing. I then explore the federal courts of appeals' reaction
to, and treatment of, probabilistic standing. In Part II, I set out my proposal
for expected value-based standing. I explain the limitations of the proposal
and also explore its ramifications. In Part III, I consider objections and criti-
cisms. I argue that the Constitution raises no barrier to expected value-based
standing, the "injury-in-fact" test requires only a positive expected value,
and the prudential barrier to generalized grievances is the sole obstacle to
expected value-based standing.
I. IGNORING EXPECTED VALUE
The best way to show the Court's disregard of expected value is to ex-
plore three key cases in which the Court denied standing on the ground that
plaintiffs could not demonstrate that their injury was likely to be redressed
by a decree in their favor: Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,3° Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO),3' and Allen v. Wright.32 In all
of these cases, the Court said that it was "speculative" or "conjectural" that
the decree would actually redress the injury.33 But if the injury were proper-
ly characterized in expected-value terms, there would have been nothing
speculative or conjectural about redressability.
The earliest of these cases is Linda R.S. v. Richard D.34 In that case, the
mother of an illegitimate child brought suit against the local prosecutor,
complaining that he had failed to initiate support proceedings against the
child's father. The plaintiff alleged that the state child-support statute was
unconstitutional because it only required support of legitimate children. The
Court denied standing. In the Court's view, the plaintiff lacked standing be-
cause she could not show that a criminal action would benefit her. The father
of the child might, for example, simply go to jail. "The prospect that prose-
30. 410U.S. 614 (1973).
31. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
32. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 758.
34. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. 614.
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cution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best,
be termed only speculative."3 5
The Court was correct to say that there was a less-than-100-percent
chance that prosecution would result in payment of support. But, on the
facts as they were alleged, the chance was far from zero. Suppose that a
prosecution would create a 20 percent chance. Would that be valueless? Let
us suppose that the annual value of child support would be $10,000; let us
also suppose that child support would be required for ten years. A 20 per-
cent chance of $100,000 is worth $20,000 (putting issues of discounting to
one side); if this is the value of the injury, why should it not count as an "in-
jury in fact"? The plaintiff's injury consisted, not of the absence of child
support but of the elimination of the incentive to provide child support that
would have existed had the law required support of illegitimate children.
36
Providing that support would have a positive expected value, and the plain-
tiff's allegation was that the prosecutor's inaction deprived her of that value.
Does this mean that Linda R.S. was wrongly decided? Not necessarily;
judicial review of prosecutorial inaction is extremely unusual.3 7 The Court
could have acknowledged the existence of "injury in fact" and still have re-
jected the plaintiff's claim on this separate ground.
The Court elaborated on the requirement of causation in its decision in
EKWRO.38 In that case, the Court denied standing to indigents who were
challenging an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") ruling that decreased hos-
pitals' incentives to provide emergency medical services to the poor. The
plaintiffs complained that they had been denied medical services as a result
of this ruling. Ultimately, the Court denied standing because the plaintiffs
could not show that a favorable decision from the Court would affect their
own situation: "It is purely speculative whether the denials of service speci-
fied in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or
instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax
implications .,39
The Court was plainly correct that the harm alleged was speculative. The
plaintiffs could not show that they definitely would have received medical
services had the IRS ruling not been adopted. But that conclusion does not
mean that the plaintiffs' injury would not have been addressed by a decree
in their favor. Their injury consisted of a decreased probability of receiving
medical assistance, and that decreased probability was certainly an injury.
Suppose there were a 10 percent chance that the plaintiffs would have been
35. Id. at 614-18.
36. The description of the harm as such assumes that the support would have a positive
expected value.
37. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985) (holding that the decision of
an administrative agency to exercise its discretion not to undertake certain enforcement ac-
tions is agency action not generally subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
38. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
39. Id. at 28, 32-33, 42-43.
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able to receive emergency medical services if the IRS ruling created the in-
centives allegedly required by statute. Does the elimination of a 10 percent
chance of receiving such services count as an "injury in fact"? If a 1-in-
100,000 chance of mortality is worth $60 (insofar as the government itself
relies on a valuation of human life of approximately $6 million),4° surely a
10 percent chance of emergency medical services, for those who need them,
should count as having positive expected value.
The third in the early line of cases that put probabilistic standing in
doubt is Allen v. Wright.4" There, the parents of children attending schools
undergoing desegregation challenged, on statutory and constitutional
grounds, the IRS's failure to deny tax deductions to segregated private
schools. 42 The plaintiffs claimed that the tax deductions increased the funds
available to segregated schools. 43 The consequence of the tax deductions-
effectively lowering the cost of tuition at private, segregated schools-they
argued, was an increase in the likelihood of white flight from the public
schools, which in turn impeded the process of desegregation." The Court
held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they could not show
that a decree in their favor-which would directly affect only the private
schools-would actually provide their children with access to more deseg-
regated public schools.
45
Here too, the Court's assertion was correct as stated. But the plaintiffs'
real injury consisted of the increased likelihood of white flight, stemming
from the IRS's grant of tax deductions to racially segregated schools. That
increased probability was hardly valueless. For parents whose children were
undergoing a process of desegregation and who feared that the process
would be defeated by government-encouraged white flight, a great deal de-
pended on the IRS acting in accordance with its legal obligations. And if the
injury consisted of the provision of certain incentives, then it would certain-
ly have been redressed by a decree in the plaintiff's favor.
Note that in both EKWRO and Allen, the Court had available a narrower
ground for dismissal: one could have justified the result in both cases on the
well-established notion that one taxpayer should not ordinarily be permitted
to litigate the tax liability of another.46 Once again, then, the availability of
expected value-based standing would not mean that either case was wrongly
decided. The Court's expressions of doubt over the uncertainty of injury
were unnecessary to the outcome.
What is most striking about all of these cases is their complete neglect
of the concept of expected value. Indeed, the Court has at times seemed to
40. See supra text accompanying note 4.
41. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
42. Id. at 739-40.
43. Id. at 745-46.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 752-53.
46. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart,
J., concurring); Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1454.
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require the opposite-absolute certainty. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
plaintiff Lyons, having been subjected to a chokehold during an earlier ar-
rest, sought to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department from employing
chokeholds to facilitate arrests in the absence of the threat of deadly force
from the suspect. 47 The Court explained that, to establish standing, Lyons
would have "to allege that he would have another encounter with the po-
lice,"48 and also
make the incredible assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Ange-
les always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter,
whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning, or
(2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such man-
ner.
49
The notion that constitutional standing would require such certainty finds no
home in the language of Article III and also seems inconsistent with judicial
interpretations that call for "actual or imminent"'5 -but not certain-
injury.5' And once again, even if positive expected value provided a basis for
standing, Younger abstention52 provided another basis for the federal courts
to decline to hear the case; indeed, the Court explicitly offered Younger ab-
stention as an alternative ground for its holding. 3 This obviated the need for
the Court to reach a questionable holding on standing.
Unlike the earlier cases, recent Court cases have sent mixed signals on
probabilistic standing.54 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court upheld the
47. 461 U.S. 95, 98 (1983).
48. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06.
49. Id. at 106.
50. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 223-231 (discussing instances of courts granting
standing to plaintiffs with uncertain or even impossible means of recovery). The oddity of
calling for near certainty is confirmed by the Court's inclusion of Younger abstention as a
second justification for denying plaintiff access to federal court. See infra text accompanying
notes 52-53. This inclusion suggests that the majority was not entirely comfortable with de-
ciding the case solely on grounds of standing-especially since application of Younger
abstention "assume[s]" that there is Article HI standing. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-12; see
also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 504-05 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)
(noting, in a very similar legal setting, that the conclusion that there was no standing made the
majority's further discussion of the availability of injunctive relief and Younger abstention "an
advisory opinion that we are powerless to render"). The Court rarely includes alternative
grounds for decision, especially where one ground is lack of standing and the other ground
presupposes the existence of standing.
52. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (holding that federal courts shall not
grant injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings, except in extenuating circum-
stances, even where a party questions the constitutionality of state law enforcement activities).
53. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-13.
54. The plaintiffs in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59 (1978), argued that they had standing in part because of the catastrophic damage they
would suffer were there a meltdown at the nuclear power plant, the construction of which they
were challenging. The Court expressly left open the validity of such an argument: "For
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standing of the State of Massachusetts to challenge the EPA's failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicle tailpipes.55 It did so
on the basis of what some have seen as probabilistic harm-harm resulting
from the anticipated effects of global warming. 6 The Court went so far as to
cite favorably some lower court cases that invoked probabilistic harm ex-
plicitly.57 At the same time, some commentators assert that, in the end, the
harm on which the Court relied-Massachusetts's proven loss of coastline
on its sovereign lands-was garden-variety harm that would typically satisfy
standing requirements.
58
The 2009 case of Summers v. Earth Island Institute59 fired a clear warn-
ing shot at probabilistic standing. Indeed, some read the case to pronounce
probabilistic standing's death knell. 60 Such pronouncements, however, are
inaccurate. First, the holding in Summers applies specifically to organiza-
tional standing; 61 the case can be read to have no impact whatsoever on
broader questions of standing, including the viability of probabilistic stand-
purposes of the present inquiry, we need not determine whether all the putative injuries identi-
fied by the District Court, particularly those based on the possibility of a nuclear accident and
the present apprehension generated by this future uncertainty, are sufficiently concrete to satis-
fy constitutional requirements" Id. at 73.
In 2007, the Court denied a petition for certiorari that asked it to resolve the validity of
probabilistic standing. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Me. People's Alliance, 552 U.S. 816 (2007); see
Nash, supra note 21, at 521 n.122 (noting the open nature of the question); see also The Su-
preme Court, 2006 Term-Leading Cases, 121 HARv. L. REv. 185, 269-75 (2007) (criticizing
the Court for failing to confront the issue in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)).
55. 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007).
56. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541-42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 525 n.23 (majority opinion) (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glick-
man, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F2d 328,
329 (7th Cit. 1993)). I discuss Mountain States and Evans below. See infra text accompanying
notes 88-89 and 97-100, respectively.
58. See, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordi-
nary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1701, 1752-56 (2008); Nash, supra note 21, at 510 n.79.
59. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
60. E.g., Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing,
and the Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 412 (2009) (describing the Court in Summers as
having "more emphatically" than before "rejected the possibility of using probabilistic harms
to establish standing, at least in the case of alleged procedural injuries and on a record that did
not establish a factual basis for the probabilistic analysis").
61. Accord Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Govern-
ment in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 390 n.137 (2011) ("In ... Summers v.
Earth Island Institute, Justice Scalia rather decisively rejected the idea of probabilistic injury
in the organizational standing context .... Whether the skepticism toward probabilistic injury
displayed by the Summers majority will be carried over beyond the organizational context is
uncertain'"); Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing,
but a "Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89, 91 (2010) ("Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion rejected the concept of organizational standing based
upon the statistical probability that some of an organization's members will likely be harmed
in the near future by a defendant's allegedly illegal actions.").
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ing. Second, a careful reading of the opinion suggests, if anything, general
support for standing grounded in expected values.
The plaintiffs in Summers were environmental interest organizations
seeking a nationwide injunction against the U.S. Forest Service's exemption
of certain forest areas from onerous regulations.62 A five-Justice majority
found standing to be lacking.63
The facts in Summers introduced (if implicitly) two aspects of uncertain-
ty to the standing analysis. The first aspect was whether someone who
alleged concrete intent to visit a forest area that was to be affected by the
challenged exemption would have standing. The Court broke no new ground
here. Consistent with its holding in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 4 the
Court indicated that such an allegation would be sufficient to support stand-
ing.
65
The second aspect of uncertainty raised by Summers was the notion of
multiple claimants, where perhaps only one of those claimants satisfied the
minimal traditional standing requirements. 66 To elucidate the Court's treat-
ment of this aspect of uncertainty, let us simplify-and add some
concreteness to-the facts in Summers. Assume (1) that there were twenty-
five national forests that could be affected by the challenged exemption, and
(2) that there was a single plaintiff organization consisting of twenty-five
members, each of whom professed a concrete intent to visit each one of the
forests in the near future. The Summers Court held that there was no stand-
ing in such situations, rejecting what it called "a hitherto unheard-of test for
organizational standing: whether, accepting the organization's self-
description of the activities of its members, there is a statistical probability
that some of those members are threatened with concrete injury. 67
Importantly, however, the Court had two ways to reach its ultimate
conclusion. First, it could have said that, even if the twenty-five members
provided affidavits showing concrete intent to visit a forest-such that at
least one member was sure to suffer concrete harm from the absence of the
nationwide injunction (under the normal standard for injury the Court
continued to recognize in Summers)-there would still not be standing
because the precise identity of the member(s) who would be harmed could
not be ascertained. But the Court did not take this option. Instead, it took a
second course, reasoning rhetorically: "Without individual affidavits, how is
62. In particular, the organizations sought to bar enforcement of "regulations that ex-
empt small fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects from the notice, comment, and
appeal process used by the Forest Service." Summers, 555 U.S. at 490.
63. Id. at 500.
64. 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (indicating that although allegations consisting of" 'some
day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans"-are insufficient to establish
standing, concrete assertions may be sufficient).
65. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 495-96 (finding, consistent with Lujan, allegation of a
mere "vague desire" to visit an affected forest-as opposed to "firm intentions or concrete
plans"-insufficient to support standing).
66. Id. at 493-97.
67. Id. at 497.
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the court to assure itself that" the organization in question has enough
members so as to ensure, with some statistical probability, that at least one of
its members is facing concrete harm?68 The implication of this logic is that the
first option remained open-i.e., had the organization provided affidavits for
the twenty-five members, there would have been standing.69 Thus, mere
uncertainty as to the identity of the plaintiff who will be harmed 70 is not
sufficient to defeat standing. Put another way, the problem in Summers was
not that expected-value analysis was inconsistent with standing (since a one-
in-twenty-five chance of concrete harm among twenty-five claimants would
be sufficient to yield standing), but only that the plaintiff organizations failed
to provide adequate proof to support the expected-value analysis necessary
to establish standing. In the end, then, while Summers limits organizational
standing grounded in expected value, it seems also to endorse the possibility
that expected value could justify standing for groups of plaintiffs that
provide proof sufficient to meet the ordinary standing requirements.71
In its 2010 decision in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the Court,
by a seven-one vote, endorsed the view that a probabilistic harm can be suf-
ficient to provide standing. 72 The Court held that growers of alfalfa that was
not genetically modified had standing to seek injunctive relief against a gov-
ernment agency that would have deregulated genetically-modified alfalfa.
The Court reasoned that "[a] substantial risk" that the conventional alfalfa
farmers' crops would be contaminated by modified genes from deregulated
crops was "sufficiently concrete" to constitute a cognizable injury.73
Most recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court, in a
five-four decision, found that lawyers, journalists, and human rights advo-
cates did not have standing to challenge the application of a new provision
68. Id. at 499.
69. One way to understand, if not to justify, this distinction is to realize that the gov-
ernment may actually enjoy a benefit from being able to choose regulatory action that
comparatively few people are likely to have standing to challenge. Were the Summers lawsuit
allowed to proceed on the basis of organizational standing, the government would lose this
benefit, and almost all government action could be challenged once a large enough interest
group was assembled. Cf Michelle Fon Anne Lee, Note, Surviving Summers, 37 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 381, 407-08 (2010) (noting that Summers "was probabilistic only in the sense that plain-
tiffs did not know, at this early stage, what the agency was planning to do," and that, "[o]nce
the agency implemented its regulations, the identity of the injured persons would be knowa-
ble"). On the other hand, if individuals actually submit affidavits supporting standing with
respect to all possible applications of a regulation, the case for standing is much clearer. Since
the government can anticipate a challenge no matter what it does, there seems less reason not
to allow a lawsuit challenging the action to proceed earlier.
70. See id. (categorizing Summers as an "uncertain plaintiff" case).
71. Cf id. at 408-09 (acceding that "[t]here is some chance ... that some uncertain
plaintiff cases, more 'truly probabilistic' than Summers"-specifically cases where, after
agency action, the fact that one plaintiff will be harmed is statistically certain but the identity
of that plaintiff remains unknown-"might survive Summers," but also observing that "the
likelihood that the Court would allow such cases to move forward seems low").
72. 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
73. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754-55.
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of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") enacted by the EISA
Amendments Act of 2008.74 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument in
favor of standing-that the likely surveillance of their "foreign contacts"
would intercept their communication with those contacts 75-as "too specu-
lative" and "not certainly impending. '76 The Court laid out a five-part causal
chain, each link of which would have to be met for the claimed harm to
come about, but also which itself would be, in the Court's view, overly
speculative.
77
In spite of the seeming hostility of the Clapper holding to less-than-
certain harm constituting injury for standing purposes, there is much in the
Clapper opinion that suggests that standing based on probabilities is far
from foreclosed, and indeed that the holding in Clapper may be tied to the
unique nature of the circumstances raised by the case. First, the majority
opinion agrees with the dissent that certain injury is not a requirement for
standing. 78 Perhaps, then, the real problem in Clapper was the plaintiffs'
inability-or failure-to establish that the probability of harm went beyond
speculation 79 so as to become more than de minimis.
Second, the Clapper Court cited approvingly prior decisions where "we
have found standing based on a 'substantial risk' that the harm will occur.'"8
The Court even suggested that "the 'substantial risk' standard" may be "dis-
tinct from the 'clearly impending' requirement."' If that is so, then a
substantial risk of harm might provide a separate pathway to standing.
Third, the Clapper Court went to great lengths to highlight special cir-
cumstances-present in the Clapper case-where the Court has been
historically less likely to find standing to sue. The Court noted that it has
74. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). The challenged provision is now codified as section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. V 2011).
75. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. The plaintiffs also argued that the likelihood of future
surveillance compelled them to change their behavior in the present in costly ways-such as
having to conduct interviews abroad in-person rather than by telephone or email-thus impos-
ing an economic harm today. Id. at 1150-51. The Court rejected this argument as well,
explaining that plaintiffs "cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on them-
selves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending." Id. at
1151. But cf id. at 1151 n.6 (finding plaintiffs' allegations wanting in that they cited to "only
one specific instance of travel"-"domestic travel," for an attorney to meet with other attor-
neys, that "had but a tenuous connection" to the legal allegations in the case).
76. Id. at 1143.
77. Id. at 1148-50. The Court colored similar causal chains as speculative in Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758-59 (1984), and Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488,
496 (2009).
78. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5; accord id. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
dissent hammered home the point that the Court has routinely found standing based on inju-
ries that are not certain to occur. See id. at 1160--64.
79. See id. at 1148-50 (majority opinion) (laying out a chain of speculative links that
led to the alleged injury).
80. Id. at 1150 n.5 (citing, inter alia, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct.
2743 (2010)).
81. Id.
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"often found a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been re-
quested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of
intelligence gathering and foreign affairs. ' 82 In addition, in noting the specu-
lation inherent in assessing whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (a court created by FISA) would rule on a government application for
approval of a particular surveillance, the Court observed that it has "been
reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how in-
dependent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment."83 These statements
suggest that, were a case with similar probabilities to arise outside the con-
text of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs, and where the behavior of
an independent decisionmaker were not implicated, there might in fact be
standing. Put another way, perhaps the holding in Clapper should at least be
somewhat limited to its facts.
Finally, yet another reason to read the Clapper Court's holding on
"injury in fact" narrowly is the fact that the Court offered an alternative ba-
sis for finding an absence of standing: the fact that the government may seek
approval for foreign surveillance outside the provisions of the FISA
Amendments Act meant that, "[e]ven if [plaintiffs] could demonstrate that
their foreign contacts will imminently be targeted-indeed, even if they
could show that interception of their own communications will imminently
occur-they .... cannot satisfy the 'fairly traceable' requirement."84
The lower courts have generally been more receptive to-but have also
greatly struggled with-issues of probabilistic harm and standing.85 Some
cases reveal different panels of the same court endorsing distinct, and argu-
ably inconsistent, approaches to probabilistic standing. A survey of circuit
court decisions reveals no fewer than four approaches in cases of probabilis-
tic standing. Some courts find standing satisfied where the plaintiff can
show that he or she is subject to an enhanced risk of harm. Another ap-
proach calls for a substantial risk of injury before standing will be found. A
third approach calls for a substantial probability of injury and also that the
marginal increase in risk itself be substantial. Finally, a fourth approach
seems categorically to reject probabilistic standing. In some sense, only the
last approach is fundamentally inconsistent with probabilistic standing and,
therefore, with an expected value-based approach. The second and third
approaches, however, are rather inconsistent with having standing turn on
expected value. Moreover, while the first approach is the most compatible
with an expected value-based approach-indeed, some opinions are sugges-
tive of expected value calculations-courts that adopt the "enhanced risk"
82. Id. at 1147.
83. Id. at 1150.
84. Id. at 1149.
85. For detailed surveys of the case law, see Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "the
Cloak of a Standing Inquiry": Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the
Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 188-205 (2007), and Mank, supra note
19, at 684-715.
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approach nonetheless never go so far as to adopt explicitly the expected val-
ue of the harm as the touchstone of standing.
The first approach, which several circuit courts have adopted, is to con-
clude that standing exists where an enhanced risk can be shown, even if the
injury was probabilistic and in that sense speculative. The D.C. Circuit has
adhered to such an approach in several cases. In International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Pena,86 the court considered a union challenge to a federal
regulation implementing an accord between the United States and Mexico
under which the two nations recognized one another's drivers' licenses. No
American driver could show, except speculatively, that the grant of permis-
sion would produce harm or injury to person or property. At most, American
drivers could allege that they faced an increased risk of harm, one with posi-
tive expected value. Apparently relying on the notion that union drivers
would probabilistically be on the road with drivers with Mexican licenses-
and that that would probabilistically endanger the union drivers to the extent
that the drivers with Mexican licenses were less safe-the court summarily
concluded that "the union has adequately alleged a concrete injury."
8 7
The D.C. Circuit also emphasized the importance of "enhanced risk" in
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman.
8" There, plaintiffs chal-
lenged the government's decision not to allow greater timber harvesting in a
national forest. In allowing standing, the court explained, "[W]e do not un-
derstand the customary rejection of 'speculative' causal links ... as ruling
out all probabilistic injuries. The more drastic the injury that government
action makes more likely, the lesser the increment in probability necessary
to establish standing.
''89
The Second Circuit employed an "enhanced risk" standard for standing
in Baur v. Veneman,9 ° where a plaintiff-as a citizen and consumer of
food-challenged the failure of the Department of Agriculture to ban the
use of downed livestock 9' for human consumption. The government asserted
that the plaintiff could not show an "injury in fact." Though it agreed that a
risk could count as such an injury under some circumstances, the court ar-
gued that the risk advanced by the plaintiff was merely speculative and for
that reason was not sufficient. 9 Couching its ruling narrowly, the court re-
sponded that "enhanced risk .... [iun the specific context of food and drug
safety suits . . . [is] cognizable for standing purposes, where the plaintiff
86. 17 F.3d 1478, 1480-81, 1482-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
87. See Teamsters, 17 F3d at 1483. The court also relied on a probabilistic analysis to
conclude that union members' injuries exceeded injuries suffered by the driving public at
large, in that "the union's members spend far more time on the roads than most other Ameri-
cans," so that "[r]eductions in highway safety would cause more harm to them than to typical
members of the public at large." Id.
88. 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1234 (internal citation omitted).
90. 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003).
91. " 'Downed' is an industry term used to describe animals that collapse for unknown
reasons and are too ill to walk or stand prior to slaughter." Id. at 628.
92. Baur, 352 F.3d at 632-33.
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alleges exposure to potentially harmful products." 93 As the court further elu-
cidated, "[W]e can discern no reason to distinguish between uncontested
exposure to a potentially harmful substance and potential exposure to an
undisputedly dangerous contaminant for standing purposes."94 The court
added that an exposure to increased risk must be based on a "credible threat
of harm,"95 not mere speculation. Expected value played an unmistakable
role in the court's analysis: "[T]he probability of harm which a plaintiff
must demonstrate in order to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact logically
varies with the severity of the probable harm."96 Insofar as expected value is
the product of probability and magnitude of harm, the court recognized that
an increase in one factor would compensate for a decrease in the other fac-
tor.
The Seventh Circuit also endorsed an "enhanced risk" approach in Vil-
lage of Elk Grove Village v. Evans.97 There, a municipality sought to enjoin
the Army Corps of Engineers from constructing radio towers in the flood-
plain of a nearby creek. The municipality alleged that the existence of the
radio towers would increase the risk of flooding, as well as flood-related
expenses for sandbags and overtime salaries for rescue workers. 98 Though
the municipality was "flood-prone," the court still found that the injury was
"probabilistic."99 The court concluded, "[E]ven a small probability of injury
is sufficient to create a case or controversy-to take a suit out of the catego-
ry of the hypothetical-provided of course that the relief sought would, if
granted, reduce the probability."' 00
The Ninth Circuit endorsed an "enhanced risk" approach in Ecological
Rights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., where two environmental rights
organizations sued a defendant for Clean Water Act violations. 1 1 In allow-
ing standing, the court observed that "[t]he organizations' members avoid
some activities they would otherwise enjoy in and around Yager Creek ...
because they fear that runoff from [defendant's] two facilities is damaging
the creek and its wildlife, and enjoy other activities less than they would if
there were no such runoff."'0 2 The court dismissed the notion that the plain-
tiffs had to show that the waters in question were in fact polluted: "It is not
necessary for a plaintiff challenging violations of rules designed to reduce
93. Id. at 634.
94. Id. at 634 n.8.
95. Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993).
98. Evans, 997 E2d at 329.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See 230 F.3d 1141, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2000).
102. Ecological Rights Found., 230 F3d at 1144. The court proceeded to describe the
particular allegations of two members of the plaintiff organizations. See id. at 1144-45, 1152.
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the risk of pollution to show the presence of actual pollution in order to ob-
tain standing."' 3
Other circuit court panels considering standing-including panels of the
D.C. and First Circuits-have required that there be a substantial probability
that the plaintiff will be injured (although the courts neither elaborate on
exactly what makes a probability "substantial," nor do they seem to hold
plaintiffs to an especially high standard). Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. EPA involved an environmental organization's claim that the EPA's
approval of certain ozone-depleting substances violated an international re-
gime governing the use of such substances."° The D.C. Circuit observed:
"We ... generally require that petitioners demonstrate a 'substantial proba-
bility' that they will be injured."' 0 5 Applying that standard, 10 6 the court noted
that "[o]ne may infer from the statistical analysis that two to four of [plain-
tiff's] nearly half a million members will develop cancer as a result of the
rule,"'0 7 and concluded that "this risk is sufficient to support standing."'0 8
Left unclear was why, on the court's logic, a less than 1-in-100,000 chance
of contracting cancer would be sufficiently substantial to support standing.
In Maine People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,109 environmental organ-
izations sought an injunction against a corporation for compliance with the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The First Circuit explained its
approach to standing: "To establish an injury in fact based on a probabilistic
harm, a plaintiff must show that there is a substantial probability that harm
will occur."'"10 The court endorsed the lower court's factual conclusion that
that burden had been met but without indicating what "a substantial proba-
bility" might mean.
In at least one case, a circuit court has required for standing not only that
there be a substantial probability of injury, but also that the marginal in-
crease in risk itself be substantial. In Public Citizen, Inc. v. National
103. Id. at 1152 n.12.
104. 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
105. Natural Res. Def. Council, 464 F.3d at 6 (quoting La. Envtl. Action Network v.
EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
106. In an earlier opinion, the court had considered the likely harm-"more than 10
deaths, more than 2,000 nonfatal skin cancer cases, and more than 700 cataract cases"-on an
annualized basis and found "the annualized risk posed to NRDC members to be trivial." Id.
(quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 E3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The court observed
that, with respect to that earlier holding, "[t]he parties vigorously dispute whether we were
correct to hold as a quantitative matter that [plaintiff's] alleged injury was trivial or whether, in
[plaintiff's] words, any 'scientifically demonstrable increase in the threat of death or serious
illness' . .. is sufficient for standing." Id. The court further noted that the "question has given
rise to a conflict among the circuits." Id. On rehearing, the court explained that it didn't have
to decide the question since EPA's expert, on whose model both sides relied, had informed the
court that viewing the risk in annualized terms was not practical. Id. at 7.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 471 F3d 277 (1st Cir. 2006).
110. Mallinckrodt, 471 F.3dat284.
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Highway Traffic Safety Administration,"lI a consumer organization (among
others) challenged as too stringent the government's choice of minimum tire
pressure in new automobiles. A D.C. Circuit panel reversed the district
court's determination that the consumer organization lacked standing, ex-
plaining as follows: "We have allowed standing when there was at least both
(i) a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial probability of
harm with that increase taken into account."' 12 The court postponed its deci-
sion until supplemental filings could allow it to determine whether this
standard was met." 13 On appeal after remand, the court concluded that the
organization lacked standing.' While it continued to apply the same legal
standard, the court suggested that the issue of whether probabilistic standing
was ever appropriate should be taken up by the court en banc."I5
A final approach simply rejects the idea of probabilistic standing. In
Shain v. Venema, plaintiffs challenged the Department of Agriculture's con-
struction of sewage lagoon ponds in a flood plain, alleging that the
additional displacement of water resulting from the embankments surround-
ing the ponds would adversely affect the plaintiffs' property." 6 Concluding
that the risk faced was that of a "100-year flood," the Eighth Circuit held
that standing was lacking. First, the court reasoned that "[i]f the possibility
of a 100-year flood is remote in the abstract, the possibility the flood will
occur while [plaintiffs] own or occupy the land becomes a matter of sheer
speculation.""' Second, the court found plaintiffs' allegations "vague and
conclusory" in that they "[l]eft to conjecture ... the questions whether the
marginal rise in the water level will move in the direction of the plaintiffs'
land, reach the property, and cause cognizable harm which would not have
occurred absent the lagoons.''" Third, insofar as "the 100-year label ...
designates lands most immune from flood damage .... then as [a] practical
matter, any plaintiff who conceivably could be harmed by a defendant's
111. 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
112. Pub. Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1295. The Public Citizen panel expressed some dissatis-
faction with this standard, even going so far as to state that it would not have found standing
"[w]ere we deciding this case based solely on the Supreme Court's precedents." Id. at 1296.
But, the court explained, it was bound by circuit precedent. Id.
The cases the court identified as generating the binding precedent were Mountain States
Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 E3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussed supra in text accom-
panying notes 88-89), and Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(discussed supra in text accompanying notes 104-108). This reliance is curious. Neither of
these cases established the standard enunciated by the court in Public Citizen.
113. Pub. Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1296, 1298.
114. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 E3d 234 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (rejecting Public Citizen's standing application after supplemental briefing).
115. ld. at 241.
116. Shain v. Veneman, 376 E3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 818 ("Indeed, one wonders whether any of the parties (or the court) in this
case will be alive the next time a 100-year flood occurs upon the land.").
118. Id.
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conduct would possess standing to sue in federal court." 119 The Shain court
thus seems to have rejected probabilistic standing. It bears noting, however,
that the court stated that "the jurisprudence of our sister circuits is consistent
with our holding in this case."'
' 2
1
As a whole, the courts of appeals' approaches are broadly consistent
with probabilistic standing; the framework employed by most courts would
seem to allow for probabilistic standing, at least in some cases, with the
Eighth Circuit's approach in Shain seeming most at odds with probabilistic
standing.
Consistency with expected value-based standing (as opposed to proba-
bilistic standing) is harder to ascertain. Clearly, expected value-based
standing does not call for a "substantial risk of injury": insofar as expected
value of harm is the product of the probability and magnitude of harm, a less
substantial harm can be offset by a harm of greater magnitude.12 ' The same
is true of a requirement that the marginal increase in risk be substantial.
An "enhanced risk" approach is most compatible with an expected val-
ue-based approach. Indeed, some of the "enhanced risk" cases at times use
language that alludes to expected value. 22 Still, none of these cases explicit-
ly endorse expected value as the basis on which standing should hinge.
In sum, expected value has yet to find a clear home in judicial exposi-
tions of standing. The Supreme Court has not been hospitable to
probabilistic standing in general, let alone notions of expected value. The
lower courts have been more open to probabilistic standing but, in the ab-
sence of guidance from the high court, have been inconsistent in the tests
they have applied. Moreover, to whatever extent the lower courts have
119. Id. The question of whether the harm alleged is generalizable is a separate one. As I
discuss below, under my proposal for expected value-based standing, courts would remain
free to reject assertions of generalized harm on prudential grounds. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 141-142.
120. Shain, 376 F3d at 819. The court distinguished the facts before it from those in
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (which I dis-
cuss supra in text accompanying notes 88-89). The court explained this distinction as follows:
There, the defendant's conduct directly and measurably increased the chances a fire
would start; the defendant's conduct was not merely an intervening factor that could ag-
gravate an independently occurring natural disaster. For this case to become truly
analogous to Glickman, the lagoons would have to increase the probability of a 100-year
flood itself.
Shain, 376 F.3d at 819. The court also avoided direct conflict with the Seventh Circuit's en-
dorsement of probabilistic standing in Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th
Cir. 1993) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 97-100), dismissing the court's analy-
sis there as "dicta." Shain, 376 F.3d at 819.
121. This is less important to the extent that courts applying this standard do not in prac-
tice impose a hurdle different from an "enhanced risk" approach. See infra text accompanying
note 122.
122. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
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acquiesced to some version of probabilistic standing, they have not taken
the next step of explicitly recognizing how expected value can, and
should, undergird probabilistic standing. In the next Part, I advance a pro-
posal for incorporating expected value into standing that would resolve this
confusion.
II. INCORPORATING EXPECTED VALUE INTO STANDING ANALYSIS
In this Part, I explore the idea of probabilistic standing, with particular
reference to expected value. I first set out the essentials of traditional stand-
ing analysis, with a focus on the prong that drives much of the analysis and
on which expected value-based standing turns-the "injury in fact" prong. I
then explicate my proposal for expected value-based standing. I also offer
some factors that I expect will limit the scope of the proposal. Expected val-
ue-based standing, as I propose it, would be broadly consistent with present
understandings of "injury in fact." I also explain why, if that is so, some
courts have been reluctant to embrace probabilistic standing. Last, I describe
how expected value-based standing might affect the holding and reasoning
of cases previously decided by the Supreme Court.
A. An Overview of Traditional Standing Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has made clear that constitutional standing requires
three showings by a plaintiff: (1) "injury in fact," (2) a causal link between
that injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) redressability. 123 The "in-
jury in fact" prong demands that the plaintiff show that she has suffered "an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particular-
ized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' 24
Causation calls on the plaintiff to establish that the injury is the result of
action on the part of the defendant that is subject to challenge and not the
result of independent action on the part of a party not before the court.
125
Finally, the "redressability" prong requires the plaintiff to show that it is
"likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision."'
' 26
The definition of injury drives the standing analysis. In a case where the
likelihood that harm may be experienced is probabilistic, the description of
the precise injury can be subject to manipulation. Assume, for example, that
a plaintiff who was denied admission to a school challenges the school's use
of racial group quotas as part of its admissions criteria. Is the plaintiff's in-
jury (1) the actual denial of admission (an injury he or she might still obtain
even absent reliance on quotas) or (2) the lost opportunity to compete for
123. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
124. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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admission? In these cases, it is well established that the lost opportunity is
the injury. In one early case, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,'27 the Court concluded that the prongs of injury, causation, and re-
dressability were all met "by the simple doctrinal device of recharacterizing
the injury .... as involving not admission to medical school but the oppor-
tunity to compete on equal terms."' 8
By contrast, let us suppose that, in a case challenging a government reg-
ulation that allows producers of food to add an alleged carcinogen to their
product, the injury is the actual incidence of cancer. So described, the injury
seems highly speculative, for it is extremely uncertain whether the introduc-
tion of carcinogenic substances into food additives will produce cancer in
particular human beings. So speculative an injury might not seem to meet
the Court's standard for "injury in fact." In addition, defining an injury as
the actual incidence of the harm makes the redressability prong difficult to
meet. If the injury in a standard environmental case is the right not to suffer
concrete personal health damage as a result of increased environmental
risks, many environmental plaintiffs would be unable to show redressabil-
ity. 12
9
Now let us consider the injury instead as the probability that the harm
will come to pass. This description of the injury is surely far less specula-
tive-indeed, it is not speculative at all, given that the probability of harm is
certain even if the harm itself is not.'30 One might question whether proba-
bilistic harm is in some cases sufficiently particularized,' but at least some
of the Court's precedent suggests that the particularization requirement is
prudential in nature and thus not a constitutional hurdle to standing.
32
127. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
128. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 14, at 203 (citing Bakke, 438
U.S. at 280-81 n.14).
129. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 636-37 (1999) (noting the problem in the context of
suits seeking vindication of legal access to information).
130. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 14, at 228.
131. Id.
132. See, for example, FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), which holds that the ban on
generalized injuries is prudential rather than constitutional in character. If that is true, then
courts will ordinarily assume that widely generalized injuries are not cognizable, but the ban
can be overcome by a clear congressional statement. But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 5 18-20 (2007) (stressing the special status of Massachusetts as sovereign to uphold
standing, thus suggesting that an individual's injury might be too generalized to support stand-
ing). The fractured opinions in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587
(2007), further muddy the waters. Compare id. at 597-603 (Alito, J., plurality opinion) (classi-
fying the particularized injury requirement as constitutional, notwithstanding the continued
vitality of the exception recognized in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)), with id. at 615-18
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (also describing the requirement as constitutional but arguing
against extending the Flast exception on the apparently subconstitutional ground that "[t]he
courts must be reluctant to expand their authority by requiring intrusive and unremitting
judicial management of the way the Executive Branch performs its duties"), with id. at 618
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the requirement as constitutional and Flast
as flatly inconsistent with it), with id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the exception
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Moreover, the injury thus described would surely be redressable: court relief
would, under the facts as alleged, reduce the risk of harm. 33 Insofar as the
plaintiff is complaining of a probabilistic harm, there is no problem with
"injury in fact," and the redressability requirements are plainly met.
B. The Proposal for Expected Value-Based Standing
My proposal is a simple one. In deciding whether there is an "injury in
fact," the court should decide whether the plaintiff has identified a harm
with a positive expected value. The expected value is calculated by multi-
plying the magnitude of the harm by its probability. 13 4 If a positive expected
value would be sufficient to support standing were it to arise as a typical
"actual harm," then the expected value should be deemed sufficient to sup-
port standing.'35 Put another way, if the expected value were itself the
amount of a standalone harm that met the standard requirements for stand-
ing-i.e., if it were an injury that was actual or imminent-then standing for
the probabilistic harm should also be recognized. For example, if the plain-
tiff can show a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000, an "injury in fact" has been
shown.
My proposal helps to identify some of the confusions in the Supreme
Court's decisions, especially those that deny standing when the injury is
merely "speculative." At the same time, my proposal is broadly consistent
with the view of the majority of courts of appeals that, as noted above, have
in Flast can and should be extended). For a discussion of how the Court has variously treated
the requirement as constitutional and prudential, see Craig A. Stem, Another Sign from Hein:
Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Stand-
ing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1204-17 (2008).
133. See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 14, at 229.
134. See Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAU-
SATION 221, 232-35 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011) (arguing for the possibility of awards of
damages for future harm along these lines). Sometimes, the expected value may be more
complicated if there are multiple probabilistic outcomes-i.e., if there is a lottery of outcomes.
See MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 102 (2003). In that instance,
relying on the assumption of von Neumann-Morgenstem preferences over the lottery, the
expected value would equal the sum of the probability of each outcome multiplied by the
magnitude of that outcome. See id.
My proposal does not affect the propriety of discounting, where appropriate, or the ap-
propriate choice of discount rate. Thus, if the harm is to happen at some point in the future and
discounting is deemed appropriate, then the monetized value of the harm should be discounted
back to present value. It is then that value that should be multiplied by the probability of harm
in determining whether there is standing. See infra text accompanying notes 275-277.
135. To be sure, when the injury in question is not just probabilistic, but truly purely
speculative, expected value-based standing will not apply. Cf Appellate Body Report, Euro-
pean Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, para. 125,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (opinion of the World Trade Organization
Appellate Body finding no violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures where there was
no scientific evidence of risk). Other forms of standing might still apply. See Nash, supra note
21, at 511 (advancing a proposal for precautionary-based standing where there is an uncertain
risk of catastrophic and irreversible harm).
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already endorsed the notion of probabilistic standing. But, as I also noted,
different courts have reached different conclusions as to exactly what is
needed to establish probabilistic harm.
My proposal is inconsistent with those courts of appeals that have cast
doubt on probabilistic injuries as merely speculative, that have required a
substantial risk, and that have required a showing of both a substantial risk
and a substantial marginal increase in risk. In such cases, the analysis would
be greatly clarified by a focus on the question of expected value. As I ex-
plained above, 13 6 expected-value analysis puts no particular stock in a
substantial risk: a substantial risk can be undercut by a harm of lesser mag-
nitude, just as a less substantial risk may still yield a sufficiently substantial
expected value if the magnitude of the harm is large enough. And an ex-
pected-value approach is nuanced enough to separate harms that are
probabilistic from harms that are pure speculation.
Application of my proposal for expected value-based standing would
not depend on the identity of the plaintiff. Commentators and courts of ap-
peals cases have suggested' 3 7-although the Supreme Court seems now to
have rejected" 3 -the idea that a sizeable organization might have standing
even when none of its individual members would. The justification for such
an asymmetric conclusion would be that, even if any one member stands an
insubstantial chance of experiencing harm, statistically it is to be expected
that at least one member will experience harm. The fact that my proposal
requires no showing that the expected harm will be substantial avoids this
asymmetry: if it is statistically expected that at least one member will expe-
rience harm, then that member would have standing. The organization
would then have standing under the traditional rule that an organization has
standing when any one of its members has standing.
At the same time, my proposal is also compatible with rules that afford
certain categories of plaintiffs more (or less) access to a federal forum. For
example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that states enjoy
"special solicitude" in standing analysis that traditional private plaintiffs do
not. 39 Without addressing the merit of this rule,1 40 I observe that it can be
readily applied in conjunction with my proposal for expected value-based
standing: if a state would have standing to pursue an "actual or imminent"
injury that a more typical plaintiff would not, then there is no reason that a
state that had a probabilistic injury with an expected value equal to the first
136. See supra text accompanying note 121.
137. Compare Elliott, supra note 17, at 504-06 (so interpreting the court's decision in
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and endorsing that view), with
Mank, supra note 19, at 721-32 (critiquing this possibility).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 59-71 (discussing Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)).
139. 549 U.S. 497, 518-21 (2007). For a proposal to restrict a category of standing to
sovereign plaintiffs, see Nash, supra note 21, at 513-14.
140. The rule has been subject to critique. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536-40
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See generally Mank, supra note 58; Calvin Massey, State Standing
After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. RaV. 249 (2009).
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injury should have standing under the proposal while an analogously situat-
ed more typical plaintiff would not.
I think it important to emphasize that I advocate expected value-based
standing as the proper standard for determining whether there is "injury in
fact" under the Constitution. Consistent with this point, I note two important
aspects of existing standing doctrine that my proposal would in no way
override and, indeed, that are consistent with my proposed understanding.
First, prudential limitations on standing would apply, as always, and may
direct the conclusion (absent congressional action to the contrary) that there
is no standing in a case, the existence of expected value-based standing
notwithstanding. Thus, for example, the notion that assertion of a general-
ized harm is insufficient to trigger standing in federal court' 41-which some
have categorized as a nonconstitutional, prudential consideration-would
apply in cases of expected value-based standing as in all cases. 142 So too
would the political question doctrine 143 and the barrier against challenging
government inaction.'"
Second, there is no reason that Congress cannot choose to create statuto-
ry standing requirements that are more stringent than the constitutional
standard, or even choose not to grant standing at all. Because I argue that
expected value-based standing is merely authorized, not compelled, by the
Constitution, I accept Congress's ability to limit standing, or even not to
grant standing at all, where expected value-based standing could exist. At
the same time, I also believe it would be possible for Congress to recognize
new causes of action and, in doing so, extend standing beyond the common
law baseline. 1
45
I recognize that, theoretically, it is possible to show that many things
impose an exceedingly small increase in risk for an individual. If expected
value-based standing were allowed to usher such cases into federal court,
then the oft-mentioned "floodgates of litigation" would surely be thrown
open. Therefore, under the "injury-in-fact" test, I advocate a de minimis
exception to expected value-based standing: absent affirmative congression-
al intent to the contrary,146 standing should not be allowed where the
141. See supra text accompanying note 131.
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
144. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
145. See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 14, at 230-31; see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 37 (arguing that the law in question
should provide the relevant measure as to whether there has been a legal injury for standing
purposes).
146. While I see a de minimis exception as sound policy, I do not see it as necessarily
grounded in the Constitution, and also do not see why Congress should not be allowed the
freedom to abrogate it in settings it deemed appropriate. On the questionable moral justifica-
tion for, and difficulty of implementing, de minimis rules, see Matthew D. Adler, Why De
Mininis?, Soc. Sci. REs. NETWORK (June 8, 2007), http://ssrn.comabstract=992878.
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expected value of the harm in question is de minimis.147 Presumably, an ex-
pected value would be de minimis for this purpose if a corresponding
"actual or imminent" injury would be considered too low to support stand-
ing.
In short, the proposal for expected value-based standing would allow
standing when the expected value of a harm would, if it were a traditional
"actual or imminent" harm, be a sufficient basis for standing. The proposal
speaks only to the constitutional minimum requirement for standing. It does
not implicate-and indeed is generally consistent with-recognized pruden-
tial limitations on federal court standing. The proposal would clarify the
courts' current muddled and conflicting approaches to probabilistic stand-
ing.
C. The Basic Consistency of Expected Value-Based Standing with
Current Understandings of "Injury in Fact"
As I conceive of it, injury under expected value-based standing meets
the traditional requirements for "injury in fact."'48 If the expected value
would not, as a present injury, be sufficient to support standing, then neither
should it be sufficient as a future harm. On the other hand, if a present injury
of the same magnitude as the expected value of the future injury would sup-
port standing, then the expected value of the future injury should also
support standing.
If probabilistic harm thus meets the current understanding of "injury in
fact," why have courts been reluctant to embrace probabilistic standing? The
Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on the issue. 149 And while most
courts of appeals have endorsed the notion in the abstract, 150 some have im-
posed hurdles of substantiality that a plaintiff must clear in order to attain
probabilistic standing.' 5 ' A D.C. Circuit panel grudgingly followed circuit
147. Cf Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing in the context of
damages that "[t]o avoid flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost chance to be ac-
tionable should no doubt exceed a de ninimis threshold"); Porat & Stein, supra note 134, at
237-38 (advocating for the possibility of damage awards for future harm based on expected
value while noting that "[s]mall risks of future illness should not be actionable"). I note that
this corresponds to a de minimis exception that presumably exists for when actual harm gives
rise to standing.
Professor Mank proposes that individuals have standing to challenge government action
where the action would impose a risk of death or serious injury in excess of one in a million.
See Mank, supra note 19, at 737-46. I note that the de minimis threshold might function
somewhat analogously to Mank's proposed lower limit for standing. I prefer to leave the pre-
cise determination of what is de minimis to the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis
and in a textured way. Unlike Mank's bright-line rule, my expected-value analysis would con-
sider the precise nature of the harm and the time until the injury will occur.
148. For further discussion of the consistency of the proposal with existing understand-
ings of standing, see infra Section II.C. 1.
149. See supra note 54.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 85-122.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 85-115.
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precedent recognizing probabilistic standing but simultaneously suggested
that Supreme Court precedent had not validated probabilistic standing and
asked the full court to review the question en banc.
152
I see four reasons for this judicial reluctance to accept expected value-
based standing. Though none is ultimately valid, all the reasons-other than
simple confusion-are ensconced in flawed understandings of standing and
persist despite their lack of doctrinal or theoretical foundation.
First, courts may be simply confused. Some judges do not see that a
small risk of a significant harm is the same as the certain loss of a harm of a
smaller magnitude, and therefore they do not recognize that since the latter is
a sufficient basis for standing so too should be the former.153 One example,
albeit perhaps an extreme one, of how such confusion can subvert judicial
reasoning is the case of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 154 There, the Court
found that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff who had been subjected to a chokehold
during arrest had no standing to enjoin the police department from using
chokeholds unless he could allege "that all police officers ... always choke
any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter."' 55 The notion that
standing requires absolute certainty is entirely at odds with conceptions of
expected value and also with most understandings of standing doctrine. 56
Second, probabilistic injuries are not typical of the common law para-
digm of injury, 57 a paradigm to which courts have become accustomed.
Modern standing doctrine developed with the growth of the administrative
152. See supra text accompanying note 115.
153. Courts may believe, correctly, that purely speculative injuries are not a sufficient
ground for standing. See supra note 135. However, they may erroneously believe that injuries
are speculative in some cases when in fact they are not and on that basis deny standing in
cases where it ought to be found to exist.
It also may be the case that courts believe that it will be very complicated to determine
the expected value of harm in cases, see supra note 134 (discussing the possibility of calculat-
ing expected values based on lotteries of harms), and that that effort would be better used on
other issues and other cases. See Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and
Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34
EMORY L.J. 1, 49-51 (1985) (discussing how there may be justification for not correcting
errors where measurement difficulties lead to excessive error correction costs); cf Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 941 (2010)
(noting the importance of a "court's opportunity cost-the more time the court spends on a
particular interpretive issue, the less time it can spend on other issues or other cases"). How-
ever, courts may miss the point that expected value in general need not be calculated with
precision; the only relevant question is whether the expected value is non-de minimis. See
infra text accompanying notes 204-205.
154. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
155. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106.
156. See, e.g., supra note 51; infra notes 239-252 and accompanying text (discussing
examples).
157. One might understand the Court's holdings in the key cases discussed supra in Part
I-Linda R.S. v. Richard D., EKWRO, and Allen v. Wright-as resulting from the difficulties in
squaring the traditional common law paradigm with cases in which the harms claimed were
probabilistic.
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state. 158 But private common law conceptions continued to dominate as the
nascent administrative state ascended, with the result that intrusions on
common law rights and interests were seen to trigger the availability of judi-
cial review.159 In time, this changed. Congress expanded administrative
structures and, with that growth, the number of people and other societal
actors affected by regulation increased. 160 During the third quarter of the
twentieth century, federal courts responded to the shift in the structure of
law' 6 ' by looking to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 162 (which
itself codified some earlier judicial conceptions of standing' 63) to determine
whether there was standing. Under this approach, courts looked to see
whether a plaintiff had suffered a "legal wrong" or were "adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action. '""M In other words, the courts looked to see
how the law defined a protected interest and then upheld standing where a
legal injury had occurred.
In a 1970 decision, the Supreme Court abandoned this framework 165 and
replaced the "legal interest test" with "a factual inquiry into the existence of
harm."'1 66 This paradigm shift can be seen as a "respon[se] to a belief that the
private-law model no longer worked in public-law cases.'
16 7
158. See Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1438-51. But cf Ann
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV.
689, 691 (2004) (arguing that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurisprudence is not incon-
sistent with modem standing doctrine).
159. See Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1438.
160. See J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administra-
tive States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks
the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 405, 466 (1997) (positing how
administrative structure begets interested parties, who eventually seek additional legal structure);
see also J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 769-75 (2003) (presenting various met-
tics confirming the growth of the administrative state); Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of
Realism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 655, 655
("Federal regulation ... has generated massive litigation during the past 15 years through
agency and judicial review proceedings.").
161. See Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1441-44 (explaining
the shift and the reasons for it).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
163. Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1438-40.
164. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.").
165. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
166. Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1445 (citing Data Pro-
cessing, 397 U.S. at 153).
167. Id. at 1446. Other authors have also commented on the failings of the private law
model in public law cases. See Buzbee, supra note 14, at 271-82 (arguing in favor of judicial
deference to legislative definitions of harm and standing); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims,
Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REv. 183, 184-85 (arguing that the rules of civil procedure in
cases other than class actions assume a setting of private litigation rather than litigation of
aggregate rights).
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The rejection of the private law model was not, however, complete. The
1970s and 1980s saw Court decisions-including Linda R.S., EKWRO, and
Allen v. Wright-that reaffirmed standing doctrine's reliance on traditional
notions of common law harm. In particular, these decisions ensconced the
requirement of a traditional injury that is actual or imminent. Some have
argued that, underlying this approach-on which modem standing doctrine
has developed-is the view that the common law is the paradigm for
judicial intervention.168 As such, if an injury does not correspond well to an
injury at common law, courts will be reticent to recognize standing.
To the extent that courts' adherence to common law understandings of
harm undergirds their reluctance to accept probabilistic standing, this reli-
ance is troublesome. Such applications of standing frustrate Congress's
goals in creating regulatory programs in the first instance. And there is noth-
ing in Article III (or the APA) to forbid treatment of probabilistic harms as
"injuries.' 1 69 It is true that some probabilistic harms do not seem to readily
translate into traditional common law injuries. 170 But Congress may recog-
nize that harms in administrative law cases are generally probabilistic or
systemic and that agencies may implement a regulatory program to redress
harms of precisely that sort.
17
A third, related reason that may explain judicial resistance to expected
value-based standing is a belief by some judges that there are some harms
for which Congress ought not to be able to prescribe relief. Though I am not
aware of any court actually having come out and said this,17 2 it is possible
that courts often rely upon unarticulated judgments as to what constitutes an
"appropriate" injury to pursue in the federal courts. As above, such argu-
ments find no support in Article III. Further, judicial determinations of this
kind may sometimes serve to undermine the separation of powers that mod-
em standing doctrine was purportedly created to protect. 173 Courts that
168. See Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1451-59.
169. Id. at 1463; Hessick, supra note 18 at 65-70; see also Fletcher, supra note 14, at
233.
170., This may overstate matters. As I discuss below, even now, existing jurisprudence
recognizes standing in some cases in which the harm is probabilistic. See infra notes 218-231
and accompanying text. In particular, consider that in any case in which future relief-such as
injunction-is sought, one can argue that an assumption is being made about the probability
of harm continuing into the future. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
171. Cf Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REv. 221
(2008) (arguing in favor of constitutionality of standing to challenge harms that are broadly
felt by the public).
172. Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),
came close to suggesting that some claims to vindicate an undifferentiated public interest in
having the executive branch act in accordance with law should be constitutionally uncogniza-
ble: "To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers'
compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Con-
gress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' Id. at 577 (citing U.S.
CONST., art. II, § 3).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 252-257.
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preclude standing in such cases effectively detract from Congress's power to
determine the proper scope of federal court jurisdiction.
A fourth reason for courts' reluctance to adopt expected value-based
standing may be that cases of probabilistic harm are often cases in which the
harm may be shared by many and thus may seem generalized. Consider the
paradigmatic setting in which regulatory action (or inaction) may be alleged
to cause a one-in-a-million risk of disease, injury, or death. That risk may be
shared by large numbers of people, indeed even large portions (or all) of the
population. As such, the harm may be characterized as generalized, and that
may prompt courts to decline standing. In some sense, this view may also
prompt some commentators to interpret existing probabilistic-standing lower
court jurisprudence as concluding that standing is more likely to be upheld for
an organization of many members alleging a probabilistic harm than for a
single individual:'74 while the probabilistic harm of a single person seems
quite generalized, courts may be more inclined to approve of standing where
an organization of a million members brings suit. There, one can say, appar-
ently with somewhat more certainty (even though the high likelihood remains
only statistical"75), that one of the members will suffer the harm in question.'
76
That apparent (if ephemeral) increase in certainty may give courts comfort (if
false comfort) in allowing organizational standing where individual standing
would not otherwise inhere.
If the problem is that expected value-based harm tends to be generaliza-
ble, then courts should say so. Indeed, I agree that prudential rejection of
standing in cases of generalized harm should continue under an expected-
value-based-standing regime.
177
D. The Implications of Expected Value-Based Standing
My proposal, if followed, would have ramifications for standing juris-
prudence, although perhaps not quite as many on final outcomes of cases.
Here, I survey briefly the likely impact of expected value-based standing on
the Supreme Court decisions I discussed in Part I, the various conflicting
approaches taken by the courts of appeals, and standing in administrative
law cases.
178
174. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 17, at 504-06.
175. While it may be possible to show that it is statistically highly likely that one mem-
ber of the organization may suffer the harm, it might turn out that no one does, or more than
one does. Note also that this conception of the harm across the group still does not change the
fact that the harm may be generalized.
176. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (uphold-
ing standing on the ground that "[o]ne may infer from the statistical analysis that two to four
of [plaintiff's] nearly half a million members will develop cancer as a result of the rule").
177. See supra text accompanying notes 141-142.
178. Expected value-based standing might also have altered the result of the standing
inquiry in Shain v. Veneman, 376 E3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004), where the Eighth Circuit ruled
against probabilistic standing. See supra text accompanying notes 116-120. Note, however,
that the Eighth Circuit does not seem to have understood itself to have announced a blanket
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I begin with the three "building block" Supreme Court cases I discussed
in Part I. A focus on expected value would probably be sufficient to support
a finding of "injury in fact" in Linda R.S. (the expected value of child sup-
port if the government were to prosecute), EKWRO (the expected value of
medical services if the IRS changed its regulations), and Allen (the expected
value of swifter, more complete desegregation of public schools if the IRS
changed the regulations applicable to private schools). Several qualifications
are worth noting, however. First, the finding of an "injury in fact" will be
inconsistent with the result actually reached by the Court in a case only to
the extent that the Court's holding pertained to constitutional, rather than
statutory, standing. For example, the Court in Linda R.S. specifically noted
that its holding applied "at least in the absence of a statute expressly confer-
ring standing."179 It follows that even if the Court were to have concluded
that constitutional standing existed in a case, Congress would remain free to
withdraw statutory standing if it so chose. Second, even if expected value-
based standing were found to exist, the requirement that the alleged injury
be particular and not generalized would persist. 80 And of course the mere
fact that standing would have been upheld does not mean that the plaintiff
would have been victorious. Indeed, in Linda R.S., it seems that courts
would have disposed of the case on other grounds long before the case made
it to a trial on the merits.' The same probably would have been true of
EKWRO and Allen, as well: both cases could have been disposed of on the
ground that a taxpayer ordinarily cannot litigate the tax liability of anoth-
er.1
82
The proposal helps to resolve the conflicting views of the courts of ap-
peals on probabilistic standing. Recall that the expected value is the product
of the probability of the harm and the magnitude of the harm. A moment's
reflection reveals that a substantial harm will be called for only where the
relative magnitude of the possible harm is small. A sizeable harm need not
be accompanied by a substantial increase in risk in order to give rise to a
non-de minimis expected value and thus justify standing under the pro-
posal. 3
Nor should courts require a showing of both a substantial harm and a
substantial marginal increase in harm. Presumably if the expected value of
the "harm with th[e] increase[d] [risk] taken into account' is not sufficient
to warrant standing (perhaps because it is de minimis), then it must a fortiori
prohibition against probabilistic standing insofar as it proclaimed that "the jurisprudence of
our sister circuits is consistent with our holding in this case." Shain, 376 E3d at 819.
179. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
180. See Sunstein, Privatization of Public Law, supra note 14, at 1467-68.
181. See supra text accompanying note 37.
182. See supra text accompanying note 46.
183. Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing
Threshold, 97 GEo. L.J. 391,405-09 (2009).
184. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 E3d 1279, 1295
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
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be the case that the marginal increase in the expected value also would not,
by itself, satisfy standing requirements.
I note, as I did above, that recognition of expected value-based standing
might affect the reasoning of some cases even if it does not disturb out-
comes. Consider that in the typical administrative law case, a court
considering a challenge to agency action may remand the case to the agency
for further proceedings; and, on remand, it is hardly uncommon for the
agency to adhere to its original determination. In many conventional admin-
istrative law cases, it is not clear that a plaintiff will ultimately receive what
he or she wants even if he or she succeeds on the issue at hand.
To see the special difficulty with procedural injuries, consider that the
injury in a case of so-called "procedural injury" may be described in two
ways.'85 In the first, under expected value-based standing as I conceive of it,
the injury would be the procedural injury itself. As I discussed above, such a
conception of the relevant injury would remove any concerns over whether
court relief would "redress" the plaintiff's injury.'86 But the Supreme Court
has confronted the question of standing in cases of procedural injury on rare
occasions and, although it has upheld standing, it has offered little justifica-
tion for that result. On those occasions, the Court has eschewed reasoning
based on probabilistic injury in favor of the second conception of the rele-
vant injury-that is, relief through the reversal of the agency action.
87
For example, in a footnote in its opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life,188 the Court suggested that a relaxation of the redressability requirement
would be appropriate in cases involving a procedural injury: "There is this
much truth to the assertion that 'procedural rights' are special: The person
who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests
can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressa-
bility and immediacy."'89 Implicit in the Court's reasoning is that the
relevant injury is the plaintiff's "concrete interests" in reversing the relevant
agency action.
The Court took a similar tack in FEC v. Akins. 190 There, the Court ap-
proved standing in a case where a remand from the courts back to an
185. See supra text accompanying notes 127-133.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133.
187. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998). The court reasoned as follows:
If a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the
agency's action and remand the case---even though the agency (like a new jury after a
mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a
different reason. Thus respondents' 'injury in fact' is 'fairly traceable' to the FEC's deci-
sion not to issue its complaint, even though the FEC might reach the same result
exercising its discretionary powers lawfully. For similar reasons, the courts in this case
can 'redress' respondents' 'injury in fact.'
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 129, at 636-37 (noting the Akins
Court's dodging of the probabilistic issue).
188. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
189. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
190. 524U.S. 11.
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administrative agency was not guaranteed to afford the plaintiffs the ulti-
mate relief they sought. The Court explained, "Agencies often have
discretion about whether or not to take a particular action. Yet those adverse-
ly affected by a discretionary agency decision generally have standing to
complain that the agency based its decision upon an improper legal
ground."'' It is not surprising, then, that the Court rejected the
government's argument that standing was unavailable. While the Court sure-
ly drew the correct conclusion in Lujan and Akins, the Court's reasoning is
scant and unconvincing. Why, after all, should procedural injuries be treated
differently from other injuries-particularly since the standing requirement
originates in the Constitution?
Thus, my proposal for expected value-based standing provides a simpler
basis for finding standing in cases of procedural injury. Invocation of ex-
pected value-based standing removes the need to apply the redressability
prong with less stringency in cases of procedural injury. As such, it treats
cases of procedural injury in the same way as other cases. It is important to
realize, however, that, while the proposal may have applicability in certain
types of administrative law cases, the proposal's scope is by no means re-
stricted to administrative law cases.
192
III. OBJECTIONS AND CRITICISMS
Skeptics might raise several objections to my proposal. I address them in
this Part. I consider arguments that question (1) whether courts are
competent to evaluate expected value-based standing, (2) whether expected
value-based standing extends standing too far past the limits set by existing
jurisprudence, and (3) whether expected value-based standing is normative-
ly desirable.
A. Are Courts Competent to Evaluate Expected Value-Based Standing?
An initial question is whether courts are competent to make the calcula-
tions (that is, to calculate the product of the probability and magnitude of the
relevant harms) and determinations necessary to apply expected value-based
standing. If we cannot expect courts to do so competently, then it matters little
whether expected value-based standing is consistent with existing jurispru-
dence or whether it is normatively desirable.
In fact, courts already perform similar calculations in different settings.
First, consider the responsibility of a judge in determining whether to grant
bail and, if so, at what level. Among the factors the judges must weigh under
the standard test are the defendant's risk of flight and the risk of future
harm.'93 Both factors ask the court to make determinations based on risk.
191. Akins, 524 U.S. at 25.
192. See supra notes 14-16, 23-24 and accompanying text.
193. For federal authority, see 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a) (2006) (directing that a "judicial
officer" determine whether someone who has been arrested should be "released or detained");
id. § 3142(f)(2) (directing that a detention hearing should be held, inter alia, where there is "a
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Consider next the judicial determination of whether to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction. In such circumstances, a court is directed to weigh, among
other things, the irreparable harm to the defendant if the injunction issues
and the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, against the irreparable
harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not issued. 194 Here, the court must
make at least three estimates of probability. While one of the factors-the
likelihood of success on the merits-may fall within a court's particular area
of expertise, 95 the others-determining whether granting the injunction will
result in irreparable harm-calls on the court to make more difficult calls of
probability. 196 The court must determine whether any harm is indeed likely
to occur (or continue) in the future and, if so, whether there is a sufficient
showing that the harm will be irreparable. 197
In addition, consider the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Caperton v.
A.T Massey Coal Co., where the Court held that the Due Process Clause
required an elected judge's recusal when there was an "intolerable probabil-
ity of actual bias."'198 The Court concluded as follows:
serious risk that such person will flee" or "a serious risk that such person will obstruct or at-
tempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or
intimidate, a prospective witness or juror"); id. § 3142(e) ("If, after a hearing ... the judicial
officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such
judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial."); id. § 3142(g)(4) (listing,
among the factors to be considered in determining the conditions of release, "the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's
release").
194. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 E2d 589, 593-94 (7th
Cir. 1986).
195. But cf Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doc-
trine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 410, 440 (2003) (asserting that open-ended judicial assessments
may result in a court's certainty that equitable relief is proper based on the merits even when
equities may weigh against such relief).
196. See Nash, supra note 21, at 517 (putting the question of whether to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction in the language of the precautionary principle); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible
and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 866-69 (2006) (discussing preliminary injunc-
tions in environmental cases in the context of the irreversible harm precautionary principle).
197. Consider as well the question of whether a defendant has acted negligently in fail-
ing to undertake a particular precaution that, had it been taken, might have avoided the
negligent injury complained of. Judge Learned Hand's famous formula calls on courts to de-
termine the probability that the injury would occur in the absence of the precautionary step.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169, 173 (1947) ("[I]f the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL"). Not only do courts routinely make such determina-
tions but the question is often left to juries to decide.
The question of whether the test for an injunction is as reducible to formula as the negli-
gence standard has been the subject of debate. Compare Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at
593 (developing formula to describe dispositions of preliminary injunction requests), with Linda
J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum of Its Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
279 (1987) (criticizing Judge Posner's formula in American Hospital Supply Corp.).
198. 556 U.S. 868, 882, 886-87 (2009).
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[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable
perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had
a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the
case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent.' 9
Finally, an approach that incorporates expected-value calculations is also
present in the Court's test for determining whether a criminal defendant is
prejudiced-and therefore perhaps entitled to relief-by virtue of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."200
199. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884. At the same time, the Caperton case also demonstrates
some of the difficulties courts encounter when dealing with probabilities. The Court had to
explain no fewer than three links in the probabilistic causal chain. First, the Court explained
that Blankenship's (the litigant's) "campaign contributions-in comparison to the total amount
contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the election-had a signifi-
cant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome." Id. at 885. Second, the Court
noted the following link:
The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and
the pendency of the case [was] critical. It was reasonably foreseeable, when the cam-
paign contributions were made, that the pending case would be before the newly elected
justice. The $50 million adverse jury verdict had been entered before the election, and
the Supreme Court of Appeals was the next step once the state trial court dealt with post-
trial motions. So it became at once apparent that, absent recusal, Justice Benjamin would
review a judgment that cost his biggest donor's company $50 million. Although there is
no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the fact remains that Blankenship's extraordi-
nary contributions were made at a time when he had a vested stake in the outcome.
Id. at 886. Third, the Court acknowledged the contention by the petitioner that, although there
was neither a bribe nor criminal influence, "Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt
of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected." Id. at 882.
Dissenting, Chief Justice Roberts took issue with the majority's probabilistic findings. Id.
at 890-91 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). He noted that, while Blankenship had made large contri-
butions in furtherance of Justice Benjamin's election, "large independent expenditures were
also made in support of Justice Benjamin's opponent." Id. at 900-01. The Chief Justice further
questioned the extent to which Blankenship's contributions affected the outcome of the judi-
cial contest:
It is also far from clear that Blankenship's expenditures affected the outcome of this elec-
tion. Justice Benjamin won by a comfortable 7-point margin .... Many observers
believed that Justice Benjamin's opponent doomed his candidacy by giving a well-
publicized speech that made several curious allegations; this speech was described in the
local media as "deeply disturbing" and worse. Justice Benjamin's opponent also refused
to give interviews or participate in debates. All but one of the major West Virginia news-
papers endorsed Justice Benjamin. Justice Benjamin just might have won because the
voters of West Virginia thought he would be a better judge than his opponent.
Id. at 902 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
One also can find an expected value-type approach in an analysis that some states call on
judges to conduct in deciding whether to allow the holder of a contingent remainder to raise a
claim against a present holder of property. Some courts hinge the cognizability of such a claim
on the likelihood that the contingency that must occur for the contingent remainder to vest will
in fact come to pass. E.g., Union Cnty. v. Union Cnty. Fair Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Ark.
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To be sure, there are settings in which courts have been historically reti-
cent to engage in difficult probabilistic assessments. For example, the
anticipatory nuisance doctrine generally bars nuisance suits until it can be
alleged that a nuisance actually exists. 20 1 Courts are also often reluctant to
award damages for lost profits in contracts cases on the grounds that they
are speculative. 2 2 Still, even if courts sometimes refrain from probabilistic
damage calculations, they often do award probabilistic damages. 20 3 Moreo-
ver, the calculation required to determine whether there is standing need not
be as precise as it often must be in other contexts-to set damages, for ex-
ample. In any event, my overarching point is not that courts embrace all
opportunities to engage in probabilistic calculations, only that they do so-
and are quite capable of doing so-in many circumstances.
For purposes of exploring expected value, I do not suggest any kind of
complex arithmetic. In most cases, the central issues will be straightforward.
In addition, the calculations will often not have to be precise"4; all that a
court must analyze is whether there is a positive expected value, not the ex-
act amount.20 For these reasons, the issue of judicial competence does not
seem to be a serious problem.
1982) ("The holder of a possibility of reverter can restrain an act of waste by the holder of a
determinable fee only when it appears that there is a reasonable certainty that the fee will
terminate and the waste would cause serious damage to the property."); Pedro v. January, 494
P.2d 868, 875 (Or. 1972) ("It is clear that if the chances are remote that the contingency vest-
ing the interest will occur, courts will not give relief of any kind to the contingent
remainderman. On the other hand, if the contingency is fairly certain, and, therefore, the like-
lihood of damage to the remainderman is high, courts are more inclined to aid him.").
201. See, e.g., Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973) (en banc).
Note that this feature of common law nuisance has been cited as a justification and explana-
tion for the emergence of the modem environmental regulatory state. See JESSE DUKEMINIER
ET AL., PROPERTY 759-61 (7th ed. 2010).
202. See HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14:16 (2011).
203. E.g., Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing "the inescapa-
bly probabilistic character of many injuries").
204. Cf Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984) ("Mhe constitutional component of stand-
ing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition?'); ERWIN
CHEMER1NSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIrCION 67 (6th ed. 2012) ("No formula exists for determining what
types of injuries are adequate to allow a plaintiff standing to sue in federal court.").
The lack of need for precision will mitigate the incentive for plaintiffs to overstate, and
defendants to understate, the extent and likelihood of harm. Indeed, precise calculations may
often be very difficult in probabilistic settings. Query, for example, with respect to the Evans
case (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 97-100), how one might calculate the pre-
cise harm resulting from the increased risk of flooding.
205. Cf Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938), super-
seded in part by 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988) ("It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim [in a
federal diversity case] is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal."); Mor-
rison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (1lth Cir. 2000) ("[A] plaintiff who bases
diversity jurisdiction on the value of injunctive relief must show that the benefit to be obtained
from the injunction is 'sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy the... amount in controver-
sy requirement .... ' (alterations in original) (quoting Ericsson GE Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Motorola Commc'ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 221 (11 th Cir. 1997))).
May 2013] 1319
Michigan Law Review
B. Does Expected Value-Based Standing Extend Standing Doctrine
Too Far Beyond Its Existing Constitutional Moorings?
Is expected value-based standing consistent with existing constitution-
al doctrine? Some people might be skeptical. 216 My defense of expected
value-based standing proceeds in two basic steps. I first respond to the
argument that expected value-based standing is inconsistent with the re-
quirements that the Supreme Court has identified for standing-and, in
particular, that it calls for recognizing injuries that do not satisfy the exist-
ing "injury in fact" requirements. Second, I bolster my argument by
demonstrating that my proposal for expected value-based standing would
not fundamentally alter most of existing standing doctrine. To do this, I
show first that existing law recognizes (if implicitly) various forms of
standing based on probabilistic analysis. I also ground the consistency of
expected value-based standing with existing law by arguing that injuries
in cases of expected value-based standing are often felt, in various ways,
in the present.
207
I begin by observing that the Supreme Court has left open the validity
of probabilistic standing.218 Indeed, although it has never recognized it
formally, the Court has from time to time acquiesced in the notion of
The situation where the probability of harm truly cannot be established with certainty thus
presents a slightly different problem. For a discussion of the possibility of precautionary-based
standing that might apply in certain cases, see Nash, supra note 21. Cf Dan M. Kahan et al., Risk
and Culture: Is Synthetic Biology Different? (Yale Law Sch. Cultural Cognition
Project, Working Paper No. 29, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1347165 (arguing that cultural background may influence risk
perceptions and applying the point empirically to perceptions about risks posed by global warm-
ing as opposed to synthetic biology).
206. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 541-42 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the speculative nature of injury from global warming); supra text accompanying
note 115 (describing the suggestion by a D.C. Circuit panel that the viability of probabilistic
standing be addressed by the court en banc).
207. Because my proposal for expected value-based standing is broadly consistent with
existing standing doctrine, it differs from other proposals to revamp standing jurisprudence. For
example, Professor Elliott suggests, as an alternative to standing, allowing federal courts to ab-
stain in cases where the requirements for what is now standing are not met. See Elliott, supra
note 17, at 510-14. She does not argue that a system of abstention would be consistent with
existing jurisprudence. Instead, she recommends jettisoning existing standing jurisprudence as
unworkable. Id. at 510 n.254 ("Calling upon the Court to abandon many of its standing decisions
does implicate stare decisis, but as the Court has made clear in numerous cases, stare decisis does
not require slavish devotion to precedent that fails."); see also David A. Dana, Existence Value
and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HIARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 343, 397-99 (2004) (describing
the constitutionality of standing based on the "existence value" of particular natural resources,
while also noting that considerable Supreme Court precedent is unfriendly to the concept); Rich-
ard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN.
L. REv. 943 (2008) (arguing in favor of jettisoning "injury-in-fact" analysis and instead granting
relief against the government only to enforce a clear duty).
208. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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probabilistic standing. 2 9 Next, I recall the discussion above in Section II.C
to the effect that injury as conceived under expected value-based standing
meets the traditional requirements for "injury in fact." Only if the expected
value of the probabilistic injury is sufficiently concrete will there be ex-
pected value-based standing. Having established that the existing
understanding of "injury in fact" is broad enough to encompass injuries in
cases of probabilistic harm, I turn to points that bolster that conclusion.
First, there are existing standing doctrines that rely, if implicitly, on prob-
abilistic analysis. Second, the injury in many cases of expected
value-based standing can be felt in the present.
I identify five types of standing under existing doctrine that rely, if im-
plicitly, on probabilistic analysis. First, standing is in some sense
grounded on probabilities almost any time an allegation of future harm is
the basis for standing."' After all, one can rarely be certain that an alleged
future harm will indeed come to pass. Standing rests on the probability
that it will in fact come to pass. Consider, for example, Younger abstention
doctrine, under which federal courts abstain from enjoining pending crim-
inal prosecutions. 21 This means that standing to proceed in federal court
must extend precisely to cases where the there is no prosecution pending
yet the threat of prosecution is sufficiently high enough.21 2 As another ex-
ample, consider the Court's 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC.2 l3 The Court
upheld the petitioner's right to challenge a federal election law rule that
allowed petitioner's opponent to receive greater contributions than usual
based on petitioner's intent to spend more than $350,000 of his personal
funds on his campaign. 214 Justice Alito's opinion for the Court explained
that the federal election rule in question "would shortly burden his ex-
penditure of personal funds by allowing his opponent to receive
contributions on more favorable terms. 12 5 The Court concluded that "there
was no indication that his opponent would forgo that opportunity,"
21 6
209. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 210-
231.
210. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001) (noting important distinction in theory of standing
between actions at law for damages and actions in equity for an injunction against future
harm); Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and Taxpayer
Suits, GREEN BAG, Autumn 2002, at 17, 19-21 (to same effect).
211. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (holding that federal courts may not
enjoin pending criminal state proceedings in which the defendant alleges the criminal statute
is unconstitutional, except in extenuating circumstances).
212. Compare id. at 41-42 ("[P]ersons having no fears of state prosecution except those
that are imaginary or speculative, are not be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs."), with Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (finding standing to pursue injunction against pro-
spective state court prosecution where petitioner alleges threats of prosecution that are not
"imaginary or speculative" (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 42)).
213. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
214. Davis, 554 U.S. 724.
215. Id. at 734.
216. Id.
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apparently on the ground that "the record at summary judgment indicated
that most candidates who had the opportunity to receive expanded contri-
butions had done so.
' 217
The Court's reliance on what "most candidates" under the relevant cir-
cumstances would do indicates tacit endorsement of probabilistic standing.
Even beyond that, the Court assumed (without stating) that the additional
funding the opponent could or would receive would make it more likely
that the opponent would win the race. And, insofar as the petitioner's real
harm would seem to be losing the election, that conclusion also rests on
probabilities.
Standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act similarly rests on proba-
bilistic calculation. The Act permits federal courts to "declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. '21 8 Professor Borchard's
justification for allowing declaratory judgments rests on the ground that a
"prospective victim" ought not to be told "that the only way to determine
whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool is to eat it. '21 9 Put anoth-
er way, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows a "prospective victim" to
determine "whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool" before eat-
ing it-while the chance that it is in fact a toadstool is merely
probabilistic. The Supreme Court has underscored this probabilistic under-
standing of the Act, recognizing as a basic proposition that
where threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a
plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge
the basis for the threat .... The plaintiff's own action (or inaction) in
failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution,
but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction.
2
1
0
It is on this basis, moreover, that facial constitutional challenges are per-
missible.
22 1
A possible response is that these examples are settings in which the
probabilistic requirement for standing is very high-perhaps nearing vir-
217. Id. at 735.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
219. Edwin M. Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 561, 589 (1931).
220. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007) (emphasis omit-
ted). The Court proceeded to affirm that Article Ill jurisdiction can also exist in "situations in
which the plaintiff's self-avoidance of imminent injury is coerced by threatened enforcement
action of a private party rather than the government." Id. at 130.
221. Id. at 128-29 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Exparte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) ("The physi-
cian is the one against whom these criminal statutes directly operate in the event he procures
an abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions. The physician-
appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. They should not
be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.").
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tual certainty.222 I turn now to settings where that is not necessarily the
case.
Existing law also incorporates a probabilistic approach into standing
doctrine where the actual question in a case is moot but standing is found to
exist lest the question be permitted to evade judicial review. 223 Here, two
probabilistic assessments implicitly undergird standing: there is the
probability that the event in question will arise again, and there also is the
probability that a justiciable controversy will arise.
2 24
Fourth, consider the logic of allowing standing in overbreadth challeng-
es. While the ordinary rule in standing is that one does not have standing to
raise the rights of others, a special rule applies in First Amendment cases.225
Overbreadth doctrine allows parties to raise facial challenges to speech re-
strictions that are overbroad in that they reach a substantial amount of
protected speech in relation to their legitimate scope, even if the challenging
party's speech may in fact be unprotected.226 In effect, overbreadth doctrine
allows a plaintiff to pursue a case in which he or she cannot show that he or
she has suffered actual harm because the potentially unconstitutional re-
striction could constitutionally be applied to his or her speech. Rather, in
effect, he or she is allowed to pursue the claim of some similarly situated
third party whose protected speech is unconstitutionally abridged.2 7 The
justification for this exception to the rule is that, were it otherwise, "persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exer-
cising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute
susceptible of application to protected expression." '228 But this logic only
holds if one accepts that it is probable that there are third parties whose be-
havior will be chilled. In this sense, standing to pursue overbreadth
challenges may also be seen as probabilistic.
Fifth, consider standing in administrative law cases. In many conven-
tional administrative law cases, there is no assurance that a plaintiff will
ultimately receive what he or she wants, even if he or she succeeds on the
issue at hand. Nonetheless, courts routinely recognize standing in such
222. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), which seems to require absolute certainty
of some harms).
223. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
224. For example, in Roe v. Wade, the justiciable controversy that could arise was that
the government would again threaten to prosecute the act in question. Id.
225. KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 144-45 (2004) (discussing how overbreadth
doctrine allows individuals to challenge statutes as they apply to other parties); see also Mi-
chael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 264-68
(1994) (arguing that overbreadth doctrine should extend beyond the First Amendment). But
see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 21-30 (arguing that standing
rules that apply in First Amendment overbreadth cases are not special).
226. See WERHAN, supra note 225, at 144-45.
227. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (discussing reasons for
allowing a party to raise other parties' claims in an overbreadth attack).
228. Id.
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cases. 2 9 And the Supreme Court, on the rare occasions it has confronted the
issue, has endorsed the conclusion that standing exists in such cases of pro-
cedural injury.
230
The best response in administrative law cases is to assume that when
Congress creates a procedural right, it does so not because the right will
necessarily lead to particular results but because procedural rights create
desirable structures, incentives, and probabilities-and also because they
increase the legitimacy of any government interference with substantive
rights. From this perspective, the injury in these cases satisfies the "injury-
in-fact" requirement. In addition, however, the injury in these cases is also
probabilistic.
231
These five instances where existing standing doctrine incorporates prob-
abilistic analysis provide support for the notion that my proposal for
expected value-based standing is not significantly inconsistent with existing
law. Support for this premise may also be found by considering the various
ways in which the injury in cases of probabilistic harm may be felt by the
injured party in the present.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 185-191.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 185-189 (explaining that the Court has reached
this conclusion without offering much in the way of reasoning and by applying standing's
"redressability" prong less stringently than it does in other contexts).
231. Justice Breyer has offered an argument along these lines for treating procedural
injuries as concrete. While serving as a circuit judge, he confronted a somewhat related ques-
tion: whether injury under NEPA should qualify as "irreparable" under the standard for
whether to grant a preliminary injunction. NEPA requires the government to make a detailed
statement, as a matter of process, of the environmental impacts of major government actions,
see 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006), but it does not apply any substantive requirement that those
possible environmental impacts actually affect the final decisions the government takes, Sun-
stein, supra note 129, at 621. At the end of the day, even if the court orders the agency to
comply with the statutory requirements, the agency may yet choose to adhere to the decision it
originally reached. Put another way, compliance with the statute affords aggrieved plaintiffs
only a probabilistic chance that the agency will change its decision. On the other hand, courts
cannot grant a preliminary injunction where the plaintiff cannot establish irreparable harm.
But how can the injury in a NEPA case be seen as "irreparable" when it might in the end have
no effect at all?
In one opinion addressing the issue, Justice Breyer explained that "when a decision to
which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed environmental consideration
that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered." Massachusetts
v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983). He elaborated on this point in a subsequent case:
[T]he harm at stake is a harm to the environment, but the harm consists of the added risk
to the environment that takes place when governmental decisionmakers make up their
minds without having before them an analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely
effects of their decision upon the environment. NEPA's object is to minimize that risk,
the risk of uninformed choice, a risk that arises in part from the practical fact that bu-
reaucratic decisionmakers (when the law permits) are less likely to tear down a nearly
completed project than a barely started project.
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500-01 (1st Cir. 1989) (reaffirming the validity of the
First Circuit's holding in Watt in the wake of intervening Supreme Court precedent).
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There are three ways that illustrate how probabilistic harm may be expe-
rienced in the present.23 2 First, a risk of harm in the future may generate
economic effects in the present. To illustrate, this logic predicts that stocks
will not vary in value upon the official announcement of earnings that match
the market's preexisting expectations. The stock price would have already
incorporated the change in earnings once it became expected.233 Along these
lines, property values tend to decrease in the face of risk of environmental
contamination and harm. 234 It thus is not surprising that the courts have up-
held standing on such grounds. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's
decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., upholding a plaintiff environmental organization's standing to
pursue an industrial facility's alleged Clean Water Act violations in a civil
suit.235 One of the organization's members "attested that her home, which
[was] near [the facility in question], had a lower value than similar homes
located farther from the facility, and that she believed the pollutant dis-
charges accounted for some of the discrepancy."
236
232. Beyond the three situations discussed in the text, growing scientific evidence sug-
gests that exposure to toxic chemicals in fact may have a physical effect in the present. See
Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1671, 1704-11 (2007) (describing scientific evidence of present physical changes at
the molecular level that could be described as early stages of a disease); Albert C. Lin, The
Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 897, 955-61 (discussing
subcellular harm). Incorporation of this scientific knowledge may one day change the way we
think about future harm and risk of harm. Grodsky, supra, at 1725-26. But cf Porat & Stein,
supra note 134, at 234 (critiquing as "artificial" legal arguments that ground liability for future
harm on the notion that latent harm is already present or that dread of future harm is already
present).
233. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indica-
tors of Common Stocks' Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 294 (1994) (explaining the efficient
market hypothesis).
234. See Thomas A. Jackson, Environmental Contamination and Industrial Real Estate
Prices, 23 J. REAL EST. RES. 179 (2002) (finding environmental contamination leads to reduc-
tion in industrial property values before and during remediation); Robert A. Simons & Jesse
D. Saginor, A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Environmental Contamination and Positive Amen-
ities on Residential Real Estate Values, 28 J. REAL EST. RES. 71 (2006) (finding that
environmental contamination reduces residential property values); see also Thomas M. Carroll
et al., The Economic Impact of a Transient Hazard on Property Values: The 1988 PEPCON
Explosion in Henderson, Nevada, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 143 (1996) (finding that a
property's value is sensitive to mean distance of property from hazard); cf Alexandra B. Klass
& Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Re-
gime for Long-Term Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 144 (2008) (noting
courts' growing willingness to award "'stigma' damages" for "an adverse impact on the value
of a property based on the market's perception that the property poses an environmental risk,"
and noting that such awards may be made with respect "not only to property that is currently
contaminated, but also to property that has a risk of future contamination or property that has
been remediated but is still perceived as posing a risk of harm").
235. 528 U.S. 167, 181-85 (2000).
236. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 182-83. Along somewhat similar lines is the
Court's reliance on the attestation by another member of the organization that "she and her
husband would like to purchase a home near the river but did not intend to do so, in part be-
cause of [the] discharges." Id. at 182.
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Indeed, individuals often act to substitute current economic cost for fu-
ture risk. Consider the institution of insurance: people who insure against
risks pay current dollars as the insurance premium. In return, they will be
reimbursed for (at least most of) the costs of the future harm insured against,
if such a harm comes to pass. If no such harm ever comes to pass, then the
insured will have paid current dollars simply to avoid the risk of a future
loss. 237 Indeed, Professor Farber argues that the existence of an insurance
market for a loss should be a consideration in determining whether standing
should exist to challenge action (or inaction) that might lead to the loss.
238
Second, even if a risk of future harm does not generate current economic
effects, it may impose intangible harms and costs. Consider first the possi-
bility of psychic harms. Dean Revesz argues for the use of a lower discount
rate for the future chance of dying of cancer.239 In such cases, the future
harm may not bring about a change in current behavior. Nonetheless, such
individuals may experience today the dread of contracting, suffering, and
dying from the disease in the future. 240 Indeed, the source of the dread is the
sense (whether true or not) that the result is inevitable and that no change in
behavior can make any difference at all. One can say that this sense of dread
exacts a current harm on those who suffer from it.
Other intangible harms may also result. Consider, for example, the fail-
ure by government to adhere to prescribed procedural requirements in
taking an administrative action. As I have discussed above, if one under-
stands the harm suffered by a plaintiff challenging the government action as
the government action itself, then the harm lies in the future (and, indeed,
court action might not redress the harm since the government could adhere
But see Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013) ("[Plaintiffs] cannot
manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypo-
thetical future harm that is not certainly impending.").
237. Financial derivatives, like insurance, offer investors the opportunity to hedge risks.
See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition
Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391,429-30 (2010).
Markets also sometimes allow litigants effectively to insure against the uncertain out-
come of litigation. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies:
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 43 (1989) (describing contin-
gency fee arrangements "as a hedge" under which "the client's exposure to loss is limited by
the attorney's assumption of the fee risk, while the client's potential gain is also limited by the
'sale' of a percentage of the claim to the attorney"); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A
Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 96-98 (2010) (describing means
by which institutional investors offer companies up-front assets in exchange for assuming risk
of litigation).
238. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123,
1126-29 (2005).
239. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Dis-
counting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999).
240. See id. at 972-74; E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia,
Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781,
785-90 (1988) (discussing the dread of "chemophobia"); Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers
Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 67, 90 (2001); Lin,
supra note 232, at 945-54.
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to its original action once it corrects any procedural deficiencies). Still, as
Justice Breyer noted, there are legitimacy costs to having the government
take actions in procedurally invalid ways.2 4' These costs likely will make
plaintiffs question the fairness of the legal system. 24 2 Beyond plaintiffs, hav-
ing the government act in procedurally invalid ways also might decrease
significantly the legitimacy of government-through agencies that are seen
to have authority to act improperly-and courts-that are seen to be ineffec-
tive checks on procedurally invalid agency action-in the eyes of society at
large.
Third, a risk of harm in the future may prompt people to change their
behavior to their detriment in the present. It is not unreasonable to expect
people to alter their current behavior and behavioral patterns in order to
minimize their exposure to risky substances or conditions. Once again, the
courts have recognized standing on this basis. Consider, again, the Supreme
Court's decision in Friends of the Earth. In upholding standing, the Court
relied on allegations that members of the organization had changed their
behavior based on the fear that the violations had contaminated nearby wa-
ters. 243 It catalogued factual findings as to how members had, variously,
reduced their activities in and near the allegedly affected waterways.
244
Many courts of appeals have followed Friends of the Earth in finding cur-
rent changes in behavior sufficient to support standing.
245
It is important to emphasize that I offer these examples to support the
general consistency of expected value-base standing with existing law, not
to suggest that these situations should comprise the universe of cases where
standing to achieve a reduction in future harm should be recognized. For
example, I do not mean to suggest that standing should exist only where an
insurance market against the loss in question exists. Even if demand for a
particular type of insurance exists, there may be reasons (for example, insuf-
ficient data from past episodes to allow for setting prices appropriately) that
preclude the development of a market for that insurance.246 In my view, the
241. See supra note 231.
242. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (1990).
243. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000).
244. Id. at 181-83 (detailing how individuals variously no longer engaged in waking,
hiking, driving, fishing, camping, swimming, and picnicking in and near the waters).
245. See, e.g., supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Masur & Nash, supra note 237, at 408-26 (describing and evaluating
possible obstacles to markets for insurance against regulatory changes); Jonathan R. Nash,
Note, Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the Availability of Hazardous Waste
Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 455, 464-66, 482-93 (discussing the ideal conditions of
insurability and explaining why a market for hazardous waste insurance lagged behind de-
mand in the 1980s); see also Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk:
Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2008) (describing the obstacles to the develop-
ment of insurance markets to address risks associated with climate change).
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question is not whether in fact people pay to avoid future harm but whether
they would be willing to do SO.
2 4 7
C. Is Expected Value-Based Standing Desirable?
The question remains whether expected value-based standing is desira-
ble. Ultimately, this is a question for Congress; my focus is on the
relationship between the ideas of "injury in fact" and expected value, not on
what Congress should do. Nonetheless, it is worth exploring the normative
question. I break this question down into two constituent issues: (1) whether
expected value-based standing would frustrate the goals of standing doc-
trine and (2) whether expected value-based standing would open the
oft-cited "floodgates of litigation" too wide.
1. Is Expected Value-Based Standing Consistent with the
Goals of Standing Doctrine?
As I discuss in greater detail below, the adoption of expected value-
based standing will allow more cases to reach the federal courts. Critics may
question whether it is in fact desirable for the federal courts to hear many of
these cases. (Here my baseline assumption is that the vast majority of these
cases will be cases brought against the federal government and thus cases in
which, absent expected value-based standing, no judicial forum will be
available. 248) I think that often the answer to this question is "yes. '249
Perhaps the most commonly cited value that existing standing doctrine
is said to further is the restriction of judicial consideration to settings in
which there is concrete adversity between the parties. This adversity is said
247. Compare Craig, supra note 85, at 189 (citing dissent in Ayers v. Township of Jack-
son, 525 A.2d 287, 321 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)),
which argued that the fact that one would have to pay another individual substantial amounts
of money for him or her to be willing to tolerate the injuries suffered by toxic tort plaintiffs in
future harm cases provides grounds for the plaintiffs to be able to collect damages.
248. There will undoubtedly be some cases that will qualify for expected value-based
standing in federal court that could also be brought in state court because the relevant state
recognizes probabilistic standing or otherwise has less restrictive standing requirements than
the federal courts. Cf James W. Doggett, Note, "Trickle Down" Constitutional Interpretation:
Should Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported into State Constitu-
tional Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 851 (2008) (observing that state standing rules can
diverge from federal norms). In such cases, the addition of the federal forum is presumably
less meaningful and less normatively desirable. Indeed, to the extent that such cases include
issues of federal law, review may be had in the Supreme Court notwithstanding the lack of
standing sufficient to support initiating the lawsuit in federal court. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kad-
ish, 490 U.S. 605,618-24 (1989).
I note that, to the extent that a state does not now recognize standing for probabilistic
harms, my proposal for expected value-based standing could apply there too.
249. In evaluating the normative desirability of expected value-based standing, I rely on
and accept the normative benefits standing is generally said to provide. In doing so, I do not
address the merits of these normative assumptions; indeed, many commentators have ques-
tioned all of them over the years. Rather, I mean only to evaluate expected value-based
standing according to the same metrics by which traditional standing is judged.
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to prevent courts from issuing advisory opinions and to ensure that courts
decide cases where the parties are truly motivated to present their most per-
suasive arguments. This is thought to provide some assurance that a court
likely will have before it all relevant concerns before it decides the case.
2
11
Standing limitations are also said to further the separation of powers and
democratic accountability. The separation of powers argument relies on the
notion that the political branches, rather than the courts, should resolve im-
portant political debates. Relatedly, democratic accountability emphasizes
that the political branches are accountable to the populace; because the
courts are not, they ought not lightly interfere with actions taken by the po-
litical branches."' Standing is said to achieve these goals by restraining the
power of the courts.
252
There are a few reasons to believe that expected value-based standing
would not impair the separation of powers and democratic accountability
goals of standing law. First, recognizing the power of Congress to authorize
causes of action where the harm is grounded in expected value may in many
settings be consistent with the constitutional separation-of-powers design.
2
1
3
If that is the case, then current jurisprudence inordinately empowers the ex-
ecutive branch at the expense of the legislature by insulating the executive
branch from court challenge where the legislature intended that it should be.
Second, cases where probabilistic injury is alleged are precisely those
settings where one might reasonably expect the political branches not to func-
tion appropriately and for democratic accountability not to spur government
into appropriate action. There are some harms that may be so large that, even
if the risk of them occurring is comparatively low (or uncertain), it makes
sense at least to confront the question of whether to address them today.2 54 But
such cases may feature political failures that make it likely that the political
250. Elliott, supra note 17, at 468-74. For criticism, see id. at 474-75 and David M.
Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist
Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 840 (2004).
251. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 17, at 468-74 (collecting authorities).
252. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 475-83 (pro-democratic function); see also id. at
492-96 (anti-conscription function). Professor Elliott proceeds to argue that existing standing
doctrine does a poor job of vindicating these goals. See id. at 483-92 (pro-democratic func-
tion); id. at 497-500 (anti-conscription function). She suggests that standing be largely
supplanted by a system of abstention under which a federal court would have the discretion to
abstain in cases where the court determines that one or more of these goals would in fact be
frustrated by litigation. See id. at 510-16. Without passing on the merits of this proposal, I
note that-if standing were to one day morph into a system of abstention, my proposal could
readily morph as well-courts should be no more inclined to abstain in a case of probabilistic
injury than in a case of ordinary injury where the expected value of the injury in the first case
equals the actual injury in the second.
253. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 283-90 (arguing that judicial determination of
whether there is standing to pursue a new federal cause of action ought to turn on the constitu-
tional provision pursuant to which the statute was enacted and the language of the enacting
statute).
254. See Nash, supra note 21, at 520 (discussing the failure of current standing doctrine
to address such problems).
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branches will not confront the issue, 255 thus making involvement of the courts
imperative if there is to be even a possibility of government action. This is
because individuals, including politicians, are likely to suffer from probabil-
ity neglect. 256 In particular, people often fail to appreciate low-probability,
high-magnitude events.25 7 This means that actors in the political branches
may not address such issues until the injury is no longer probabilistic-i.e.,
until it is too late. It also means that democratic accountability is unlikely to
impose a significant check on this tendency, since the public at large may be
similarly unlikely to recognize the importance of addressing issues of harm
when they are "merely" probabilistic. A rational decisionmaker might pre-
dict such a government failure in advance and choose to empower private
citizens to pursue judicial relief so as to mitigate the problem.
Another reason that expected value-based standing would not under-
mine the separation of powers is that the existing standing regime does not
provide a principled distinction between cases that reach court and cases
that do not. As discussed above, harms of positive expected value are eco-
nomically equivalent to actual harms of the same value.25 8 If $60 of
expected harm ought to be insufficient for standing purposes, one should
also question whether $60 in actual harm ought to be insufficient. If in the
end standing is used to impose some arbitrary line between cases that come
to federal court and those that do not, at least that arbitrary line ought to
treat cases that allege economically equivalent harms in equivalent ways.
A fourth reason to view expected value-based standing as consistent
with the separation-of-powers principle is that expected value-based
standing would do nothing to displace other doctrines that further
separation-of-powers interests. For example, the political question doc-
trine259 and the doctrine generally disallowing challenges to government
inaction260 would still be available to litigants and courts. 2 6 1
Finally, note that, to the extent that a "probabilistic harm" may ultimate-
ly come to pass, the absence of expected value-based standing will affect
not whether there is judicial review but rather the timing of that review. The
absence of a judicial forum for probabilistic harms means that aggrieved
plaintiffs must wait until a harm in fact comes to pass before seeking judi-
cial relief. And there are good reasons to think that this will quite often be
normatively undesirable. Ex post relief may not be as effective as ex ante
255. See id.
256. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002) (describing how individuals tend to overvalue some risks and
undervalue others).
257. Nash, supra note 21, at 520; see also Sunstein, supra note 256 at 74-76.
258. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
259. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (describing the political question
doctrine as a "constitutional and prudential limit[] to the powers of an unelected, unrepre-
sentative judiciary" (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Bork, J., concurring))).
260. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 141-144.
1330 [Vol. I111: 1283
Standing's Expected Value
relief, both because the relief is delayed and because the harm that accrues
until ex post relief becomes available may be substantial and even
irreversible.
262
Professor Stearns argues that standing doctrine offers a different benefit:
it protects against savvy litigants manipulating the courts' docket in order to
develop precedent selectively. 263 Because of the doctrine of stare decisis, the
evolution of law is at least somewhat "path dependent." The first case on an
issue to reach the courts may determine the rule governing similar cases for.
years to come, and yet the choice of which case that is may affect the rule
that the courts choose. Standing, then, is important because it restricts liti-
gants' ability to bring cases of their choice before the courts. Requiring
cases to develop into full-fledged controversies before they can be heard in
court precludes litigants from teeing up legal issues of their choosing for
judicial resolution.
I agree that, to the extent that my proposal invites more cases into feder-
al court, it will afford litigants some additional leeway in assembling courts'
dockets. Still, I do not think that my proposal will result in so large a change
that it will frustrate Professor Steams's normative goal. First, I observe that,
even now, litigants sometimes successfully tee up "test cases" for courts to
review. 264 Second, the court that has the largest role in establishing prece-
dent that will govern for years to come-the Supreme Court-selects the
262. Indeed, the common law's focus on ex post liability is seen as one of the reasons for
the development of the modem administrative state. See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any
Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality-Part 1: State Pollution Control Programs,
52 IowA L. REV. 186, 200 (1966).
263. Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1323 n.48 (1995) ("[C]ommentators have failed to identify
the reason [b]ehind the general presumption against [ideological] litigation [that standing
represents], namely that a contrary rule would enable ideological litigants to manipulate the
critically important path of case presentation."); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Arti-
cle III Standing to "Accidental" Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law
Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that standing is best understood to limit court access
to plaintiffs who have been injured because of chance events beyond their control); Maxwell
L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 348-
404 (1995) (marshalling historical evidence and case law to support point that standing
doctrines prevent manipulation).
264. Cf United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 840 n.l (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that, where
challenge was brought under one statutory provision but analogous challenge could arise un-
der another, "the parties have announced to this Court that they have agreed by stipulation that
the Court's decision in this matter will govern hearings under both statutes," but holding that,
"[wlhile our holding herein with respect to hearings conducted under [the first statute] may,
because of similarities between that section and [the other provision], bear on, or perhaps even
control, analogous claims with respect to hearings under [the second provision], the parties
cannot, by virtue of their 'stipulation,' confer jurisdiction on this Court to issue an advisory
opinion"); id. at 848 (Widener, J., dissenting) ("[T]his is a test case set up by the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States .... In my opinion, this case is singularly inappropriate as a test
case to determine the validity of the use of television as a means of providing to ... a prisoner
... the amount of process which he is due.").
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cases it will hear.265 While it is conceivable that litigants might team up with
a willing Court to tee up particular cases for selection-or that litigants
might successfully "read" the current Court composition so as to determine
cases that, if teed up, the Court might likely select-it seems that the
Court's discretion to choose its own docket effectively limits litigant free-
dom in this regard.
Third, I do not think that my proposal would admit so many more cases
into federal court such that the concerns that Professor Steams voices would
become substantially greater. Consider first that many circuit court opinions
already recognize some form of probabilistic standing. 66 To the extent they
do, my proposal would not admit any more cases or would admit cases only
at the margins that feature harms that are slightly more probabilistic than
harms that currently are seen to satisfy standing requirements. Second, as I
have discussed, many cases in which expected value-based standing might
be alleged are cases in which the probabilistic injury is felt in the present; 267
at least some of these cases would be heard in federal court even without
resort to expected value-based standing.
Fourth, quite apart from the limited number of additional cases that ex-
pected value-based standing would admit to federal court, I am of the view
that most of those cases that do reach federal court will not be of the sort
that raise the concerns of which Professor Steams speaks. Expanding stand-
ing to include cases of probabilistic harm will not empower litigants and
wily lawyers freely to bring any and all controversies before the courts.
There still will have to be a genuine controversy; the requirement that the
risk of future harm have an expected value that is not insubstantial will
guarantee this.
Professor Carlson has advanced the benefit of standing doctrine in keep-
ing litigation anthropocentric.2 68 Without passing judgment on whether this
is always normatively desirable,269 I observe that my proposal would do
nothing to change the status quo in this regard. Litigants would still have to
265. For an analysis of the politics underlying the Court's ability to persuade Congress
to grant this discretion, see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 85-115 (summarizing cases from the First,
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits that have accepted some form of probabilistic
standing).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 232-245.
268. See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 995-97
(1998) (arguing that standing rules may force environmental advocates to rethink environmen-
tal problems and to express them in terms of how they may affect human beings and that the
resulting refocusing of environmental advocacy would benefit courts, the public, and ultimate-
ly the environment).
269. But cf Lin, supra note 232, at 935-36 (summarizing authorities who argue that
restricting standing to injuries to people will preclude protection of the environment for its
own sake); id. at 977-83 (arguing that the problem of harm to the environment requires re-
thinking the anthropocentricity of standing analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 387 passim (2003) (arguing in favor of at least limited legal rights for
animals).
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show a positive expected value of harm in order to proceed to court. Thus,
litigation anthropocentricity will be preserved. The Supreme Court evidently
shares this view: before it upheld standing in Friends of the Earth, the Court
emphasized that "[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing
... is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff."27
Professor Kontorovich argues that standing is useful because, by limit-
ing cases in which litigants may definitively resolve issues for all possible
"victims," it preserves the ability of private individuals to bargain to efficient
resolutions.2 7 1 As Professor Kontorovich himself recognizes, his arguments
are strongest in the context of litigation over constitutional violations and
weakest for litigation over statutory and regulatory violations. 272 Acceptance
of the proposal here would recognize increased congressional power over
standing to challenge statutory and regulatory violations. As such, it would
have little effect on the balance Professor Kontorovich endorses in the con-
stitutional context.
Finally, I emphasize that my proposal for expected value-based standing
is desirable in that it vests Congress with the freedom not to grant expected
value-base standing in particular areas, or even at all. My point is simply
that the Constitution does not limit Congress's ability to extend standing to
cases where the expected value of the harm is not insubstantial, not that
Congress is in any way mandated to do so. Indeed, this approach is con-
sistent with the general canon that advocates construing constitutional grants
broadly so as to preserve Congress's freedom to proceed more narrowly if it
chooses.
2 73
2. Does Expected Value-Based Standing Intolerably Enlarge the Set of
Cases as to Which There Is Standing in Federal Court?
One question remains: whether expected value-based standing would
intolerably enlarge the set of cases that federal courts must resolve. Indeed,
commentators and judges alike often sound cautionary notes about opening
the "floodgates of litigation" to the federal courts. Such critics may object to
expected value-based standing on this basis.
270. Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000).
271. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1675
(2007) (showing that "broad standing to challenge certain types of government action could
result in inefficient outcomes because of high transaction costs and the possibility of strategic
behavior").
272. See id. at 1720-23.
273. Thus, by way of analogy, the Court has construed the constitutional grant of diversi-
ty jurisdiction more broadly than it has its statutory analog. Compare Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (interpreting the statutory diversity grant to require complete di-
versity), with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (interpreting the
constitutional diversity grant to authorize Congress to confer jurisdiction where the parties are
minimally diverse).
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My initial response is that I am speaking only of cases in which plain-
tiffs should be able to claim "injury in fact" and hence have standing under
existing law. If Congress believes that expected value-based standing cre-
ates too many lawsuits, it can respond by banning suits by those with
probabilistic injuries.
There is also an empirical question involving the extent to which recog-
nition of expected value-based standing would enlarge the universe of cases
federal courts would hear. The number of cases that expected value-based
standing would allow into federal court is not as large as one at first might
think. First, as I have discussed above, many cases that would meet the ex-
pected value-based standing threshold unambiguously meet the traditional
requirements for standing (insofar as many aspects of extant standing doc-
trine implicitly incorporate elements of expected value).
2 74
Second, it is conceivable that discounting might keep cases with even
substantial future harms from qualifying for expected value-based stand-
ing."' The notion of discounting future harm is entirely consistent with my
proposal. Indeed, the question of whether to discount is in some sense en-
tirely orthogonal to the question with which I grapple here-as is the
question of (assuming discounting is appropriate) what discount rate should
be used. It is quite possible that, even if a future harm is sizeable, the harm
after discounting would not exceed a de minimis level.
At the same time, I am careful not to overstate the point. Reliance on
discounting is not enough to respond to the possibility of opening the
floodgates of litigation. For one thing, part of the reason that expected
value-based standing is appropriate is exactly that the risk of future harm
may have effects today.276 In such cases, discounting has no role (or in some
sense has already been taken into account). For another, there are those who
argue that at least some future harms should, in at least some cases, be dis-
counted at a reduced rate or not be subject to discounting at all. 277 In short,
even if discounting may continue to keep many cases out of federal court,
the fact remains that expected value-based standing will invite some addi-
tional cases into federal court even with discounting.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 209-230.
275. Cf Revesz, supra note 239, at 998 ("Placing a value of life of $5 million, in con-
stant dollars, [and using a 5% discount rate] the maximum current amount that we could
justify spending now to avert the destruction of the human race in 500 years would be $30
million. (At the OMB rate of 7%, this amount would be only about $10!)").
276. See supra text accompanying notes 244-245.
277. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting ... on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 119
(2007) (arguing against discounting across generations); Revesz, supra note 239, at 974-81
(arguing that a lower than usual discount rate should be used to discount certain future risks of
death over the course of an individual's life); id. at 996-1016 (arguing that logic does mandate
the use of discounting in the intergenerational context and suggesting instead an appeal to a
moral theory of intergenerational obligation). But see Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 4 (argu-
ing that elimination of discounting is not the proper tool with which to vindicate concerns of
intergenerational equity); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U.
CHI. L. REv. 209 (2007) (arguing in favor of intergenerational discounting).
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A third reason that I do not expect the adoption of expected value-based
standing to overwhelm the federal courts is that the fact that a case meets the
requirements for standing does not mean that it will necessarily proceed to
trial. As I have argued above, the persisting judicial rules that restrict cases
that raise generalized harms and that preclude review of agency inaction
may still serve to keep many cases out of the federal courts.
278
CONCLUSION
My principal claim is that the law of standing has ignored the concept of
expected value. If people face a 1-in-100,000 risk of mortality, they face a
loss of expected value of $60-and a loss of $60 is surely sufficient to count
as an "injury in fact." In a number of cases, courts have held that the injury
is too "speculative" to satisfy Article III standing requirements. But a risk
that is under 50%, or 30%, or 20%, or 10%, or even 1%, should qualify as
an "injury in fact" so long as the outcome is bad enough. If a loss of $100
counts as an "injury in fact," then a small risk of a terrible outcome should
also count.
While the Supreme Court has failed to recognize explicitly the concepts
of expected value and probabilistic harm, some of its decisions show an im-
plicit understanding of these concepts. In key cases, lower courts have been
far clearer on the underlying questions. But the courts remain divided, with
some decisions suggesting that harms must be "more probable than not" or
that there must be a "substantial probability" that they will come to fruition.
These decisions are built on a serious confusion. They fail to see that the
underlying statutes are typically designed to reduce risks and to alter proba-
bilities, not necessarily to ensure different outcomes in particular cases.
Under the "injury-in-fact" requirement, it is not enough to say that an injury
is "speculative" and to deny standing for that reason. A positive non-de
minimis expected value should be sufficient to support standing.
279
278. See supra text accompanying notes174-177.
279. This Article has argued that the asymmetry in treatment between cases of probabil-
istic harms and nonprobabilistic harms be eliminated. There are two ways that this can be
accomplished. One possibility, highlighted in the text, is that a positive non-de minimis
expected value should be sufficient to support standing. A second possibility is that
low-value (but greater than de minimis) expected values should not be enough to support
standing but that existing doctrine should be amended to conform to the treatment of
nonprobabilistic harms; that is, low-value injuries should similarly be seen to fall below the
standing threshold.
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